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WHY THE LAW HATES SPECULATORS:
REGULATION AND PRIVATE ORDERING IN
THE MARKET FOR OTC DERIVATIVES
LYNN A. STOUT†
ABSTRACT
A wide variety of statutory and common law doctrines in Ameri-
can law evidence hostility towards speculation. Conventional eco-
nomic theory, however, generally views speculation as an efficient
form of trading that shifts risk to those who can bear it most easily
and improves the accuracy of market prices. This Article reconciles
the apparent conflict between legal tradition and economic theory by
explaining why some forms of speculative trading may be inefficient.
It presents a heterogeneous expectations model of speculative trading
that offers important insights into antispeculation laws in general, and
the ongoing debate concerning over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives in
particular.
Although trading in OTC derivatives is presently largely unregu-
lated, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission recently an-
nounced its intention to consider substantively regulating OTC de-
rivatives under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). Because the
CEA is at heart an antispeculation law, the heterogeneous expecta-
tions model of speculation offers policy support for the CFTC’s claim
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of regulatory jurisdiction. This model also, however, suggests an al-
ternative to the apparently binary choice now available to lawmakers
(i.e., either regulate OTC derivatives under the CEA, or exempt
them). That alternative would be to regulate OTC derivatives in the
same manner that the common law traditionally regulated speculative
contracts: as permitted, but legally unenforceable, agreements. By re-
quiring derivatives traders to rely on private ordering to ensure the
performance of their agreements, this strategy may offer significant
advantages in discouraging welfare-reducing speculation based on
heterogeneous expectations while protecting more beneficial forms of
derivatives trading.
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statutes and in the common law, in doctrines ancient and new, and at
the state and federal levels.6
Recent years have witnessed the rise of a new challenge to this
longstanding legal regime. That challenge is from over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives, private contracts for payments determined by the
changing price of some underlying commodity or financial instru-
ment.7 Trading in derivatives has grown dramatically since these
agreements first became popular in the 1980s. In the last five years
alone, estimates of the notional value8 of outstanding derivative con-
tracts have risen from $14 trillion to $70 trillion9—nearly ten times
                                                                                                                                     
to discourage speculation).
6. For other examples, see infra text accompanying notes 44-45 (discussing antiwagering
rules), 96-109 (discussing indemnity and insurable interest rules), 118-20 (discussing the margin
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), and 136 (discussing the champerty pro-
hibition and trust laws’ prudent person rule).
7. A derivative contract generally creates either an option or an obligation to make or to
receive payments determined by some changing interest rate, financial index, or market price.
See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 711-29 (5th ed. 1996) (providing an overview of derivative instruments). For example,
one common derivative is the “interest rate swap,” in which one party exchanges its promise to
make a series of payments at some floating rate of interest determined by market conditions in
return for the other party’s promise to make payments at a fixed rate. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 243-44 (describing swaps). “Exchange traded” derivatives are standardized futures
and options contracts which are traded on a regulated commodities exchange subject to the
oversight of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See infra text accompanying notes
68-72 (discussing exchanges) and 87-95 (describing federal regulation of exchange trading).
OTC derivatives, in contrast, are privately traded and often highly customized agreements that
are usually negotiated between large institutions such as banks, corporations, and pension
funds. See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling? De-
rivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86
NW. U. L. REV. 987, 989-91 (1992) (explaining derivatives); Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expecta-
tions: “Derivative Reality” and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 985, 996-1000 (1995) [hereinafter Hu, Hedging Expectations] (same); Henry T.C. Hu,
Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory
Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1464-67 (1993) [hereinafter Hu, Misunderstood Deriva-
tives] (same); Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regu-
lation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1 (1996) (same); see also infra note 238 and accompanying text
(describing the OTC market).
8. Derivatives are usually valued according to their “notional amount,” meaning the
market value of the assets or debt balance on which payments are based. See Hu, Misunder-
stood Derivatives, supra note 7, at 1459 n.6.
9. See Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1993, 1993
(1995) (estimating the notional value of outstanding derivatives at $14 to $35 trillion); Thomas
A. Tormey, Note, A Derivatives Dilemma: The Treasury Amendment Controversy and the
Regulatory Status of Foreign Currency Options, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2315 n.2 (1997)
(estimating the global notional amount of outstanding over-the-counter derivatives in 1995 at
$47.5 trillion); Elizabeth MacDonald, FASB Moving Ahead on Rule on Derivatives, WALL ST.
J., July 17, 1997, at A2 (citing Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission Arthur C.
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the U.S. gross domestic product.10 And while derivatives are often de-
scribed as instruments for hedging against business risks,11 they are
also frequently used as vehicles for speculating on everything from
fuel oil prices to home mortgage rates.12
The sudden appearance of a largely unregulated, multi-trillion
dollar market in OTC derivatives accordingly highlights the need for
a solid understanding of the nature and purpose of traditional anti-
speculation laws.13 This need is especially pressing in light of the re-
cent announcement by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) of its intent to develop a comprehensive scheme to regulate
derivatives under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).14 The CEA
is an important—if often overlooked—antispeculation law that re-
quires most futures and option contracts to be traded only after the
CFTC has approved them, and only on a regulated futures exchange
where the CFTC imposes technical rules designed to deter specula-
tive trading.15 Because applying the CEA to derivatives implies that
OTC derivatives trading is presumptively illegal absent CFTC ap-
proval,16 the CFTC’s announcement has provoked a storm of protest
                                                                                                                                     
Levitt’s estimate of $70 trillion); Suzanne McGee & Elizabeth MacDonald, Pre-Emptive Strike
by Derivatives Players, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1997, at C1 (citing an estimate by an industry
newsletter, Swaps Monitor, of $55 trillion).
10. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Gross Domestic Product:
Fourth Quarter 1998 (Preliminary), News Release BEA 98-24 (Feb. 26, 1999)
<http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrel/gdp498p.htm> (listing the current dollar 1998 U.S. GDP
at $8.5 trillion).
11. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES:
ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 25 (1994) [hereinafter GAO RE-
PORT].
12. See id. (describing derivatives speculation); see also infra text accompanying note 245
(reporting that nearly half of derivatives traders report using derivatives for speculation).
13. See infra text accompanying note 262 (discussing how derivatives users can evade an-
tispeculation laws).
14. Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 34-35) (proposed May 12, 1998).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 87-95 (describing theCEA’s exchange trading re-
quirement). The CFTC has authority to exempt classes of instruments from this exchange
trading requirement, and in the past it has avoided confrontation over the scope of its authority
by choosing to “exempt” most financial derivatives from its oversight. See Over-the-Counter
Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. at 26,116-19 (discussing exemptions for swaps and hybrids). In May
1998 the CFTC issued a release announcing its intention to “reexamine its regulatory ap-
proach” and to revisit these exemptions. Id. at 26,115. The release raises for the first time the
prospect of significant CFTC intervention in the OTC market.
16. See infra text accompanying note 255 (discussing the implications of applying the CEA
to financial derivatives and objections to the CFTC’s release). If the CEA were applied to OTC
derivatives, the CFTC would enjoy tremendous discretion to decide which types of derivatives
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from the industry and from rival agencies.17 In response, the U.S.
Congress has passed legislation that bans the CFTC from taking any
action before March 1999.18
What should Congress do when that legislation expires: allow the
CFTC to regulate the multi-trillion dollar derivatives market, or de-
clare these instruments exempt from the CEA’s antispeculation pro-
visions? The answer to this question must depend in part on whether
derivatives speculation is beneficial or harmful. In an earlier era,
lawmakers would have viewed the sudden appearance of an enor-
mous speculative market as a menace to the public welfare. During
the nineteenth century, for example, courts routinely refused to en-
force many types of speculative agreements on the grounds that
speculation was contrary to public policy.19 Legislatures shared this
negative perception of the effects of speculation well into the twenti-
eth century; both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Com-
modity Exchange Act of 1936 were passed in large part to temper the
perceived problems of “excessive” speculation in corporate stocks
and in commodities futures and options.20
                                                                                                                                     
could be traded. See infra text accompanying notes 280-83 (describing how the CFTC deter-
mines which contracts may be traded).
17. See CFTC Seeks Public Comment as it Reexamines Oversight of OTC Market, 30 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 721 (May 8, 1998) (discussing the CFTC’s announcement and the
reaction to it from the Treasury, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission); The Financial Markets Reassurance Act of 1998, H.R. 4507,
105th Cong. (1998) (limiting, if passed, the CFTC’s authority to alter the regulation of swaps
and certain other derivatives under the CEA); House Ag Chair Introduces Bill to Curtail
CFTC’s Activity in OTC Derivatives Market, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1197 (Aug. 7,
1998) (discussing the bill) [hereinafter Chair Introduces Bill]; House, Senate Committees to
Hold July OTC Derivatives Hearings, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1057 (July 10, 1998)
(discussing the CFTC’s May 1998 release and the reactions to it); Aaron Lucchetti & Michael
Schroeder, CFTC to Review OTC Derivatives Market, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1998, at C1 (same);
Timothy L. O’Brien, A Federal Turf War over Derivatives Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1998, at
D3 (same).
18. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 760(a)(3), 112 Stat. 2681 (West, WESTLAW) (imposing a “restraint pe-
riod” to expire March 30, 1999).
19. See infra Part I.A (describing the common law rule against difference contracts); Part
I.C (discussing indemnity and insurable interest rules); text accompanying note 136 (discussing
the champerty doctrine). This judicial hostility toward speculators was based on the perception
that speculators caused specific economic harms. In particular, judges condemned speculation
for being “nonproductive,” for causing destabilizing price “bubbles,” and for impoverishing
speculators themselves. For a more detailed discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 54-
62.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 83-86 (discussing the history of the CEA), 112-16
(explaining the origins of the SEA).
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More recently, however, the idea that speculation is harmful has
lost favor. Conventional economic wisdom now holds that specula-
tion—whether in stocks, real estate, or derivatives—is economically
efficient because it shifts risk to those who can bear it most easily and
helps market prices more accurately reflect underlying forces of sup-
ply and demand.21 Thus, champions of derivatives have praised them
as useful financial “innovations” that reduce risk and improve market
pricing, while critics have focused not on derivatives’ use for specula-
tion, but on the perceived problem of “systemic risk”—that is, the
chance that a derivatives trading disaster that drives one firm into
bankruptcy could trigger a chain reaction of failures at other firms.22
The modern notion that speculation serves efficiency has undermined
the claim that making derivatives subject to the CEA’s antispecula-
tion rules serves any useful purpose.
Yet economic reasoning itself cautions against simply dismissing
antispeculation laws as the mistaken products of ignorance and envy.
An important strain of the law and economics literature argues that
the common law generally favors efficient rules.23 Many contempo-
rary antispeculation laws, including the CEA, can trace their roots
back to the earliest days of the common law.24 These origins hint that
21. See infra Part II.A-B (discussing the risk hedging and information arbitrage theories of
speculation).
22. See infra text accompanying note 268 (discussing systemic risk). This focus on systemic
risk appears to provide little policy support for the CFTC’s claim of jurisdiction over deriva-
tives.
23. An extensive literature argues that because inefficient rules by definition impose
higher social costs, they tend to be challenged more often, creating a tendency for the common
law to evolve toward efficient rules without regard to the desires of judges or litigants. See, e.g.,
George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65, 72 (1977) (finding that “[i]nefficient rules ‘perish’ because they are more likely to be
reviewed”); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53-57
(1977) (same); see also Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 156-57 (1980) (discussing common law effi-
ciency and arguing that litigation will have a “moderate influence on the persistence of good
rules . . . without judicial insight”). A second strand of argument suggests that the common law
tends to be efficient because judges, as disinterested parties, are more likely to select efficient
rules than are legislatures beholden to special interests. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 569-70 (5th ed. 1998) (arguing for the relative efficiency of
judge-made law); Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into
Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1831-34 (1992) (same).
24. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 35-45 (discussing the rule against difference
contracts); 96-109 (discussing indemnity and insurable interest rules); 136 (discussing cham-
perty prohibition); 43-45 (discussing antiwagering rules); and note 136 (discussing the prudent
person rule).
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antispeculation rules actually may serve an important, if generally
unrecognized, efficiency function.
This Article seeks to shed light on the apparent conflict between
modern economic theory and the legal tradition of antispeculation
rules by inquiring more closely into the theoretical foundations of the
modern notion that speculation is efficient. Contemporary economic
theory generally emphasizes two explanations for speculative trading:
the risk hedging model, which describes speculators as traders who
profit by accepting risk from more risk-averse “hedgers,” and the in-
formation arbitrage model, which posits that speculators invest in
predictive information that allows them to trade at an advantage with
less well informed consumers and producers.25 Both provide plausible
explanations for why someone might purchase an asset for no other
purpose than to resell it, and both likely explain many trades. Moreo-
ver, both theories suggest that speculative trading promotes alloca-
tive efficiency, either by increasing the trading parties’ net welfare
(risk hedging), or by improving the accuracy of market prices
(information arbitrage).26 This explains why students of economics
tend to regard speculators as misunderstood capitalist heroes.
Yet the conventional risk hedging and information arbitrage
models of speculation may paint an incomplete and inaccurate por-
trait of speculative markets. This Article argues that any full under-
standing of speculation also must take account of differences in indi-
viduals’ subjective expectations as a reason for trading. This
heterogeneous expectations (HE) approach can explain a number of
otherwise mysterious market phenomena that have troubled scholars
who rely on the risk hedging and information arbitrage theories.
More importantly, it suggests that speculation may not be nearly so
benign a phenomenon as is often assumed. Whereas trading driven
by risk hedging and information arbitrage generally increases the net
welfare of the trading parties and improves the accuracy of market
prices, trading driven by heterogeneous expectations produces oppo-
site results: it reduces trader welfare and can distort prices.
25. See infra Part II (discussing the risk hedging and information arbitrage theories).
26. “Allocative efficiency” refers to the increase in social welfare that comes from allo-
cating society’s scarce resources to those who value them most highly, and costs to those who
find them least burdensome. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 12-17 (discussing allocative effi-
ciency). Economists recognize other types of efficiency as well. See, e.g., BREALEY & MEYERS,
supra note 7, at 323-36 (discussing “market efficiency” in setting accurate prices that incorpo-
rate all available information); see also infra text accompanying note 153 (discussing
“informational” or “pricing” efficiency).
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The HE model of speculation accordingly carries important pol-
icy implications for speculative markets, including the market for de-
rivatives. High-profile trading disasters of the sort suffered by Long-
Term Capital Management, Gibson Greetings, Procter & Gamble,
and Orange County, California, amply illustrate the risks that deriva-
tives speculation can pose for individual traders.27 The HE model
predicts, in addition, that derivatives speculation can harm the econ-
omy as a whole. Adding the insights of the HE model to those of the
risk hedging and information arbitrage theories suggests that the
multi-trillion dollar derivatives market may be a source of great effi-
ciency gains—or great losses.
To maximize derivatives’ benefits while minimizing their costs,
we need legal rules that protect beneficial forms of trading while dis-
couraging inefficient transactions. One way to do this might be to al-
low the CFTC to apply the CEA to derivatives. This approach would
force most market participants to do their trading on organized fu-
tures exchanges, where the CFTC requires traders to demonstrate
that their contracts serve a useful economic purpose beyond “mere
speculation.”28 The HE model suggests an intriguing alternative to
this “government gatekeeper” strategy, however. That alternative
would be to permit derivatives trading outside the regulated ex-
changes while amending the CEA to return to the common law rule
that viewed off-exchange derivatives—once known as “difference
contracts”—as permissible, but legally unenforceable, transactions.
By requiring off-exchange traders to rely on private ordering rather
than courts to enforce their agreements, this counterintuitive ap-
proach may discourage welfare-reducing speculation while protecting
more beneficial forms of trading.
27. See G. Bruce Knecht, Derivatives Lead to Huge Loss in Public Fund: California’s Or-
ange County has Lost $1.5 Billion in Aggressive Strategy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, at A3
(describing Orange County’s derivatives losses); Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Sued on Deriva-
tives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1994, at C1 (describing Gibson Greetings Inc.’s reported $23 mil-
lion loss from trading interest rate swaps); Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue?
A Hedge Fund Falters, so the Fed Persuades Big Banks to Ante Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1998,
at A1 (describing Long-Term Capital Management’s losses due to derivatives trading); Bankers
Trust: Shamed Again, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1995, at 87 (describing Procter & Gamble’s
$195 million loss trading in swap contracts).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 87-95 (discussing the exchange trading requirement
of the CEA). As an alternative, would-be derivatives traders would have to appeal to the
CFTC for an exemption from the exchange trading requirement. See supra note 15 (discussing
the CFTC’s authority to issue exemptions).
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The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of
American antispeculation law by exploring four instrumental exam-
ples of antispeculation rules: (1) the common law rule against differ-
ence contracts, an important precursor of many modern antispecula-
tion doctrines; (2) the Commodity Exchange Act, which provides the
basis for the CFTC’s claim of jurisdiction over derivatives; (3) the
doctrines of indemnity and insurable interest, two fundamental prin-
ciples of insurance law that are often explained as responding to
problems of moral hazard but which also have antispeculation goals;
and (4) the margin requirements and short sales restrictions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These rules illustrate how Ameri-
can law systematically discourages speculation and confines it—or at
least, confined it before the arrival of derivatives—primarily to the
securities markets and the organized futures exchanges.
Part II reviews the risk hedging and information arbitrage mod-
els of trading. The risk hedging model describes speculators as rela-
tively risk-neutral traders who earn profits by dealing with hedgers
who pay them to assume the risk of future price changes. Because
both sides to a hedging deal regard themselves as better off after
trading than they were before, risk hedging is thought to increase
traders’ net welfare. In contrast, the information arbitrage model de-
scribes speculators as traders who invest in information about future
prices that allows them to deal on advantageous terms with others in
the market who are less well informed. Although information arbi-
trage is not necessarily mutually beneficial, arbitrageurs’ trades tend
to increase the accuracy of market prices as barometers of underlying
supply and demand. Both models accordingly suggest that specula-
tion serves allocative efficiency, albeit in different ways. The net re-
sult has been a strong presumption among theorists that speculation
is beneficial.
Part III presents the heterogeneous expectations model of
speculative trading and demonstrates how it provides theoretical
support for the traditional legal hostility towards speculators. The
HE model rests on the premise that, even when traders share identi-
cal attitudes toward risk and willingness to invest in information, they
may form different beliefs about the future if they acquire different
information. Although most theoretical discussions of speculation
neglect the role this kind of subjective disagreement can play in in-
spiring trading, a notable exception can be found in the work of the
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economist Jack Hirshleifer, who has modeled speculative markets
driven by what he terms “differential beliefs.”29 In the two decades
since Hirshleifer’s papers on speculation were published, however,
the implications of his model have gone largely unrecognized and
undeveloped.30 Part III revives Hirshleifer’s approach and expands
upon it by exploring some of its striking normative implications. In
particular, the HE model contradicts the risk hedging model’s claim
that speculation improves trader welfare, and also undermines the in-
formation arbitrage model’s claim that speculation makes prices
more accurate by suggesting that HE speculation generally does not
promote price accuracy and under some conditions can actually dis-
tort prices.
Part IV reviews the impending legislative battle over derivatives
and considers some lessons the HE model may offer lawmakers faced
with the task of deciding whether and how to regulate derivatives
trading. Because regulators have found it difficult to understand and
to articulate the policy problems associated with derivatives specula-
tion, the debate thus far has been strongly flavored by a presumption
that economic theory unreservedly champions derivatives trading.
Once the insights of the HE model are added to those of the risk
hedging and information arbitrage theories, however, it becomes ap-
parent that one of the greatest regulatory challenges posed by deriva-
tives is how to protect beneficial forms of trading while discouraging
welfare-reducing transactions. Lawmakers presently appear to face a
binary choice: either apply the CEA to financial derivatives, or ex-
empt them. The first approach makes trading presumptively illegal
absent CFTC approval, and may therefore discourage beneficial risk
hedging and information arbitrage transactions. The second strategy,
however, invites excessive HE speculation. Part IV explores an alter-
native: amend the CEA to return to the common law rule that
treated off-exchange derivatives as unenforceable, but not criminal,
transactions. This approach would reinforce the CFTC’s regulatory
role by requiring derivatives users who want their contracts to be le-
29. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. Hirshleifer’s work on speculation should
not be confused with his influential earlier piece on the welfare effects of information arbitrage.
See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive
Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971) [hereinafter Hirshleifer, Information and Invention];
see also infra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of Hirshleifer’s 1971
article).
30. See infra text accompanying note 165 and Part III.A.4 (discussing Hirshleifer’s model
and possible reasons why it has not attracted much attention).
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gally enforceable to do their trading on organized futures exchanges,
subject to the CFTC’s substantive review. At the same time, off-
exchange trading could still flourish. Outside the regulated ex-
changes, however, traders would have to rely on reputation, rather
than the coercive power of the state, to ensure the performance of
their agreements. As will be seen, this time-honored strategy may
harness the phenomenon of private ordering in a fashion that dis-
courages welfare-destroying speculation while preserving more bene-
ficial forms of trading.
I. ANTISPECULATION RULES IN AMERICAN LAW
To some observers, the claim that the law discourages specula-
tion at first may seem implausible. Speculative trading appears to be
the order of the day on stock exchanges like the New York Stock Ex-
change, and on commodities futures exchanges like the Chicago
Board of Trade, not to mention the burgeoning derivatives market.
How then can the law be hostile to speculators?
The answer lies in recognizing that speculators’ presence in such
highly visible but limited arenas obscures their relative absence else-
where. In theory, there is no need for speculators to limit themselves
to trading corporate securities and those relatively few commodities
contracts officially listed for trading on an organized futures ex-
change. They also could wager on the future prices of plastic surgery,
narrow ties, Manhattan condos, popular television shows, and law
school graduates.31 In practice, speculation in such goods and services
is rare. The reason can be traced to a network of obscure but impor-
31. This Article focuses on the phenomenon of speculation, which can be understood as a
form of disagreement-based wagering on future market prices. See infra Part III.A.1-2
(describing the heterogeneous expectations model of speculative trading). Individuals who be-
lieve that they can make superior predictions for the future can also try to profit from others’
subjective disagreement by placing wagers on the outcomes of horse races, card games, and
sporting events. This latter type of speculation is more commonly known as “wagering” or
“gambling,” and like speculative trading in markets, it traditionally has been subject to severe
legal restraints. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing the regulation of wa-
gering). Although the heterogeneous expectations model of speculation may offer a variety of
insights into the nature and appropriate regulation of disagreement-based wagering, the market
for gambling probably differs significantly from the market for speculative trading. For exam-
ple, gamblers who participate in games based on pure luck, such as slot machines or lotteries,
may well share homogeneous expectations regarding the probability of winning, and small-
stakes gambling at race tracks or in glitzy casinos may provide significant recreational benefits.
A discussion of the gambling market accordingly lies beyond the scope of this Article.
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tant legal doctrines that severely limit speculators’ role in most mar-
kets.
One of the most fundamental of these doctrines is the common
law requirement that speculators who want to wager on prices
through futures and options agreements have to make and accept de-
livery of the goods and services they trade. Although few contempo-
rary legal scholars seem aware of this rule, it persists in a variety of
modern forms, most notably in insurance law32 and the Commodity
Exchange Act.33 Its net effect is to confine speculation primarily to
regulated commodities futures exchanges, which are exempt from the
general rule, and to the corporate securities market, where delivery is
relatively easy and inexpensive. Even in these markets, moreover,
speculators who seek short-term profits must run an obstacle course
of margin requirements,34 position limits,35 short sales restrictions,36
capital gains rules,37 and other technical regulations that have both
the purpose and the effect of deterring speculative trading. The ar-
cana of modern tax, securities, and commodities law provide a second
important curb on speculation.
The net result is a legal system that works with surprising consis-
tency to channel our nation’s economic energy toward the actual
production and distribution of goods and services, and away from the
pursuit of short-term trading profits. In illustration, the discussion
below considers some important examples of antispeculation rules
drawn from both statutes and common law. These rules suggest a pat-
tern of legal antipathy toward speculators that springs from the long-
standing belief that speculation wreaks economic harm because it is
nonproductive, distorts market prices, and impoverishes speculators
themselves.
A. The Common Law Rule Against Difference Contracts
One of the earliest and most important examples of antispecula-
tion law can be found in the common law doctrine that shall be re-
ferred to below as “the rule against difference contracts.” Difference
32. See infra Part I.C (discussing indemnity and insurable interest doctrines).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91 (discussing the CEA’s exchange trading re-
quirement).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 118-20 (discussing margin requirements).
35. See infra text accompanying note 95 (discussing position limits).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 121-25 (discussing short sales restrictions).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 137-39 (discussing capital gains rules).
STOUT TO PRINTER 04/15/99  4:22 PM
714 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol:48:701
contracts were close cousins to futures (contracts for the sale of
goods for future delivery) and options (agreements granting one
party the right but not the obligation to buy or sell at a specified price
at or before some predetermined future date).38 In a difference con-
tract, however, the contracting parties would agree to perform not by
actually delivering the good that was the subject of the contract, but
by paying the difference between the contract price and the market
price at the time of performance. Thus a “seller” who didn’t own
wheat and a “buyer” who didn’t want wheat might have entered a dif-
ference contract for one ton of wheat at a contract price of $1,000 per
ton, to be settled in six months. If at the end of six months the market
price for wheat had risen to $1,200 per ton, the seller would pay the
buyer $200. If the price had dropped to $900 per ton, the buyer would
pay the seller $100. In either case, no wheat would actually change
hands.39
The common law regarded difference contracts as legally unen-
forceable on grounds of public policy.40 As the United States Su-
preme Court described the rule in the 1884 case of Irwin v. Williar:41
The generally accepted doctrine in this country is . . . that a contract
for the sale of goods to be delivered at a future day is valid, even
though the seller has not the goods, nor any other means of getting
them than to go into the market and buy them; but such a contract is
only valid when the parties really intend and agree that the goods
are to be delivered by the seller and the price to be paid by the
buyer; and, if under guise of such a contract, the real intent be merely
38. See WILLIAM F. SHARPE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 916, 923 (6th ed. 1998) (defining fu-
tures and options); Hazen, supra note 7, at 989-90 (same).
39. This is an example of a futures contract performed by settling differences. In the case
of an options contract, the buyer might purchase the right to be paid the difference between the
contract price for one ton of wheat and the prevailing market price for wheat during some fu-
ture time period. Such a right would be valuable only if the market price for wheat rose above
the contract price during the option period.
40. See, e.g., State v. Stripling, 113 Ala. 120, 123-24 (1896) (dictum) (stating that difference
contracts have been “the source of great injury to morals”); Cunningham v. National Bank, 71
Ga. 400, 403-05 (1882) (stating that difference contracts are “fraught with . . . evil conse-
quences” and are hence contrary to public policy); Rumsey v. Berry, 65 Me. 570, 574 (1876)
(dictum) (emphasizing that difference contracts are “against public policy, and not only void,
but deserving of the severest censure”); Cassard v. Hinmann, 14 How. Pr. 84, 90-91 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1856) (invalidating a difference contract under a law prohibiting betting and gaming for fear
that speculative contracts would become “as common as legitimate dealing”); Brua’s Appeal,
55 Pa. 294, 298-99 (1867) (holding invalid promissory notes for debts owed on a speculative
contract on the grounds that “[a]ll gambling is immoral” and leads to misery and suffering).
41. 110 U.S. 499 (1884).
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to speculate in the rise or fall of prices, and the goods are not to be
delivered, but one party is to pay to the other the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market price of the goods at the
date fixed for executing the contract, then the whole transaction con-
stitutes nothing more than a wager, and is null and void.42
This rule against “settling differences” offers a variety of useful
insights into antispeculation law. First, it suggests a perceived link be-
tween speculation and gambling,43 a link that is considered again in
Part III.44 Common law courts regarded speculation as a type of wa-
gering rather than a useful form of economic commerce. Thus differ-
ence contracts, like private wagers, were declared legally unenforce-
able.45
A second striking aspect of the rule is the strategy it employed to
discourage speculation. In effect, the rule forced speculators who
wanted their contracts to be enforceable to trade in the underlying
“spot market,”46 making and accepting delivery of the goods they
bought and sold. The rule thus imposed a “tax” on speculators by re-
quiring them to incur expenses that they could have avoided if differ-
ence agreements had been enforceable. For example, spot market
speculators would incur substantial transportation expenses trading
in commodities that were bulky (wheat), obstinate (livestock), or dif-
42. Id. at 508-09 (emphasis added).
43. See Stripling, 113 Ala. at 123-24 (“One of the most pernicious forms of gambling is
‘speculating in futures,’ on margins, and settling differences only.”); Cunningham, 71 Ga. at 403
(declining to enforce difference transaction and confessing that “[i]f this is not a speculation on
chances, a wagering and betting between the parties, then we are unable to understand the
transaction”).
44. The heterogeneous expectations model suggests that the difference between specula-
tors and certain gamblers is simply that speculators disagree in their predictions for market
prices, while gamblers disagree in their predictions for horse races, political elections, and other
nonmarket events. See infra text accompanying note 164 (describing gambling as disagreement-
based trading). Thus antiwagering laws may be another form of antispeculation rule.
45. Private wagers have been invalid and unenforceable since the earliest days of Ameri-
can common law. See Irwin, 110 U.S. at 509-10 (discussing the illegality of wagering); NA-
TIONAL INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING: 1776–1976 62 (1977) [hereinafter THE LAW OF
GAMBLING] (same). Even in those limited venues where wagering is now allowed (e.g., li-
censed casinos and pari-mutuel racetracks), gambling remains a highly taxed and highly regu-
lated industry.
46. In the “spot” market, a sale is followed by the immediate delivery of the commodity in
question. See SHARPE ET AL., supra note 38, at 929. In the “cash forward” market, delivery is
delayed by agreement. See BARBARA L. CARROLL, FINANCIAL FUTURES TRADING 175 (1989).
For convenience, this Article uses the phrase “spot market” to describe both sorts of transac-
tions.
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ficult to transfer securely (gold bullion). Requiring delivery also
forced speculators to bear the costs and risks of “carrying” goods—
storing, protecting, maintaining, even feeding and watering them—
during the period between purchase and sale. Finally, the rule re-
duced speculators’ liquidity by tying up their wealth in inventory.47
For some forms of property, these transaction costs would be rela-
tively small: baseball cards and corporate stocks could each be spot
traded relatively cheaply.48 In most markets, however, delivery
greatly increased the cost of taking a speculative position.49 The rule
against difference contracts thus raised a significant hurdle to specu-
lation in most goods and services.50
A third remarkable feature of the rule against difference con-
tracts is that is was explicitly grounded in public policy. Some cases
phrased this policy in moral terms,51 describing difference contracts as
“tainted and poisoned”52 and “the source of great injury to morals.”53
Other cases, however, justified the rule as necessary to temper
speculation’s supposedly pernicious economic consequences. In other
words, speculation was thought to harm not just morals, but markets.
Concern for speculation’s economic effects was reflected in three
curious charges courts lodged against speculators in difference con-
47. Speculators could reduce carrying costs and restore liquidity through measures such as
buying insurance on warehoused inventory, or taking out loans secured by inventory. These
strategies involve their own costs, however.
48. Spot market speculation in baseball cards and stocks accordingly is relatively attrac-
tive. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of speculation in the
stock market).
49. Consider, for example, the expenses associated with spot trading in real estate, live-
stock, or plastic surgeons’ services.
50. Buyers and sellers who trade goods and services because they grow them, produce
them, consume them, or use them in a manufacturing process must also incur transportation,
storage, and liquidity costs. These sorts of traders, however, both expect and desire sales con-
tracts that call for physical delivery: a milling company can only turn wheat into flour if the
wheat is delivered. Speculators, in contrast, would prefer to avoid delivery by structuring their
transactions through futures and options contracts that are ultimately settled simply by paying
the difference between the contract price and the market price at time of settlement.
51. See, e.g., State v. Stripling, 113 Ala. 120, 123-24 (1896) (describing difference contracts
as injurious to public morals); Cunningham v. National Bank of Augusta, 71 Ga. 400, 404
(1882) (stating that difference contracts are “immoral” and “fraught with . . . evil conse-
quences”); Rumsey v. Berry, 65 Me. 570, 574 (1876) (stating that difference contracts are
“deserving of the severest censure”); see also Edwin W. Patterson, Hedging and Wagering on
Produce Exchanges, 40 YALE L.J. 843, 852 (1931) (citing “moral sentiments of the community”
as a source of judicial hostility towards difference contracts).
52. Cunningham, 71 Ga. at 403.
53. Stripling, 113 Ala. at 124.
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tract cases. The first was that speculators were nonproductive.54 Thus
judges refused to enforce difference contracts on the grounds that
speculation “promote[d] no legitimate trade”55 and “discourage[d]
the disposition to engage in steady business or labor . . . .”56 This ar-
gument seems to have been based on a perception that speculators’
profits came out of the pockets of the unfortunates who traded with
them, so that speculators were social parasites who fed on others’ la-
bor while themselves contributing nothing to the community.57
A second economic concern mentioned in difference contract
cases arose from speculators’ supposedly harmful effects on market
prices. Speculators were associated with market instability and espe-
cially the puzzling phenomenon of price bubbles.58 Thus judges con-
demned speculators because their trading “agitate[d] the markets”59
and “derang[ed] prices to the detriment of the community.”60
54. See Patterson, supra note 51, at 853 (arguing that many judges and commentators are
hostile toward difference contracts because they consider the contracts unproductive activity);
cf. THE LAW OF GAMBLING, supra note 45, at 97 (“The public remains wary of speculative ac-
tivities whose appeal lies in the prospect of ‘getting rich quick’ . . . without any physical or in-
tellectual effort.”). Common law courts similarly condemned wagering as nonproductive. See
id. at 62; see also, e.g., Amory v. Gilman, 2 Mass. 1, 11 (1806) (Sedgwick, J., concurring) (“The
practice of gaming . . . withdraws the exertions of men from useful pursuits.”).
55. Melchert v. American Union Tel. Co., 11 F. 193, 195 (D. Iowa 1882).
56. Justh v. Holliday, 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) 346, 349 (1883).
57. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania described it:
Anything which induces men to risk their money or property without any other hope
of return than to get for nothing any given amount from another, is gambling, and
demoralizing to the community, no matter by what name it may be called. . . . [T]he
losing party has received just as much for the money parted with in the one case as
the other, viz.; nothing at all. The lucky winner of course is the gainer, and he will
continue so until fickle fortune in due time makes him feel the woes he has inflicted
on others.
Brua’s Appeal, 55 Pa. 294, 298-99 (1867).
58. This association between speculators and price bubbles is also apparent in section 2 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which states that “securities . . . are susceptible to . . . ex-
cessive speculation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in . . . prices.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78b (1994).
59. Melchert, 11 F. at 195 (also identifying “sudden fluctuations in values” as the
“illegitimate progeny” of speculation).
60. Justh, 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) at 349; see also Kirkpatrick & Lyons v. Bonsall, 72 Pa. 155,
158 (1872):
[V]entures upon prices invite men of small means to enter into transactions far be-
yond their capital, which they do not intend to fulfil, and thus the apparent business
in the particular trade is inflated and unreal, and like a bubble needs only to be
pricked to disappear; often carrying down the bonâ fide dealer in its collapse.
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A third apprehension judges voiced in difference contracts cases
related to speculation’s supposedly deleterious effects on speculators
themselves. By offering an easy way to bet on market prices, differ-
ence agreements were thought to tempt people into accepting unrea-
sonable risks.61 The sad result, according to some cases, was to “fill
the cities with . . . bankrupt victims” of speculative fever, along with
their impoverished dependents.62
Parts II and III reconsider these arguments and explore how
they may or may not be supported by economic theory. For the mo-
ment, it should be noted that even while judges in difference contract
cases condemned speculation generally, they also appeared to recog-
nize that some forms of difference contract trading might be socially
beneficial. This intuition was reflected in two important exceptions to
the general rule of unenforceability: the exception for indemnity
agreements, and the exception for exchange-traded futures.
While generally refusing to enforce contracts of sale not in-
tended to be settled by delivery, common law courts applied an ex-
ception in cases where one party to a difference contract could dem-
onstrate that the contract served a legitimate hedging function. Such
a party would have to show that at the time she entered the contract,
she held an economic interest that would be damaged by the hap-
pening of the very same event that would allow her to profit under
the contract.63 Thus, for example, a plaintiff seeking to enforce a dif-
ference agreement that allowed her to profit if wheat prices fell might
demonstrate that she held a wheat inventory, the value of which
would be damaged by a price decline.64 Because such a contract
would offset a preexisting source of loss rather than creating an op-
61. See Justh, 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) at 348-49 (“[T]he inevitable effect of [difference con-
tracts] is to encourage wild speculations . . . .”); Cunningham v. National Bank, 71 Ga. 400, 404
(1882) (emphasizing that speculation encourages unreasonable risk with resulting losses);
Brua’s Appeal, 55 Pa. at 299 (stating that speculation “induces men to risk their money or
property” and results in bankruptcies); see also Patterson, supra note 51, at 853 (describing the
judicial perception that speculation leads to the “impoverishment of losers and their depend-
ents”).
62. Justh, 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) at 349. An increase in the incidence of financial ruin was
thought to spawn its own social ills. See Cunningham, 71 Ga. at 403 (declaring that speculation
results in “bankruptcies, defalcations of public officers, embezzlements, forgeries, larcenies,
and death”); Brua’s Appeal, 55 Pa. at 299 (positing that speculation contributes to “failures and
embezzlements by public officers, clerks, agents and others acting in fiduciary relations”).
63. See Patterson, supra note 51, at 851-52.
64. See id.
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portunity for gain, courts recharacterized these types of contracts as
enforceable “indemnity” agreements.65
The indemnity exception to the rule against difference contracts
suggests that judges recognized that difference agreements could be
used for insurance as well as for gambling.66 At the same time, the
fact that the indemnity exception was an exception implies a judicial
perception that many difference contracts didn’t insure against a pre-
existing risk. In other words, risk hedging was perceived as the excep-
tion—not the rule—in difference contract trading.67
The notion that some difference contracts served a useful hedg-
ing function while others did not also underlay the second important
exception to the rule against difference contracts: the exception for
exchange-traded futures. To finance theorists, any contract of sale for
future delivery is a “future.”68 In legal terminology, however, the
word “future” is sometimes interpreted more narrowly to apply only
to the highly standardized contracts for future delivery that are
traded in “pits” on organized commodities exchanges such as the
Chicago Board of Trade.69 Traders who buy exchange-traded futures
are technically entitled to demand delivery. As a practical matter,
however, most exchange-traded futures are settled through an
“offset” process in which one party to the contract extinguishes her
obligation by reentering the pit and purchasing a second, offsetting
contract. Thus a trader obligated to sell 100 bushels of wheat on May
1 might offset her obligation by purchasing a contract to buy 100
bushels on May 1, absorbing the price difference as profit or loss.70
In economic substance, an offset futures contract looks very
much like a difference agreement. Courts nevertheless adopted very
differing attitudes toward the two types of transactions. As Justice
Holmes explained in the 1905 case Board of Trade of Chicago v.
Christie Grain & Stock Co.:71
65. See id.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 105-09 (exploring the relationship between specula-
tion and insurance).
67. This contradicts the risk hedging model’s prediction that speculators will always trade
against hedgers. See infra Part III.A (discussing the risk hedging model of speculation).
68. See sources cited supra note 38.
69. See generally William L. Stein, The Exchange-Trading Requirement of the Commodity
Exchange Act, 41 VAND. L. REV. 473, 488 (1988) (discussing the legal definition of futures).
70. See John Buchovecky, Comment, The Future of Leverage Contract Trading Under the
Futures Trading Act of 1986, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 157, 159 (1987) (discussing offset).
71. 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
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There is no doubt that the large part of those [futures] contracts is
made for serious business purposes. Hedging, for instance, as it is
called, is a means by which collectors and exporters of grain or other
products, and manufacturers who make contracts in advance for the
sale of their goods, secure themselves against the fluctuations of the
market by counter contracts for the purchase or sale, as the case may
be, of an equal quantity of the product, or of the material of manu-
facture. . . . It seems to us an extraordinary and unlikely proposition
that the dealings which give its character to the great market for fu-
ture sales in this country are to be regarded as mere wagers . . . . A
set-off is in legal effect a delivery. We speak only of the contracts
made in the pits, because in them the members are principals.72
As this language suggests, courts perceived organized futures
markets as serving primarily the bona fide insurance needs of com-
modities suppliers and consumers, rather than the passions of specu-
lators.73 To preserve these benefits,74 courts accordingly declared off-
set to be a form of delivery distinguishable from the forbidden
practice of settling differences.75 The technical distinction between
“offset” and “settling differences” provides an interesting example of
an early attempt to devise a legal rule that discouraged harmful
speculation while protecting more valued forms of trading.76 It also
laid the foundation for the primary legal regime governing
“difference contract” trading today: the Commodity Exchange Act of
1936.
72. Id. at 249-50.
73. While in Holmes’s day most organized futures trading may have reflected hedging by
commodities consumers and suppliers, this may no longer be true. See CARROLL, supra note
46, at 55 (estimating that commercial hedging accounts for only 20% of daily trading volume in
financial futures).
74. Holmes’s opinion also seems to recognize, at least in lay terms, the exchanges’ poten-
tial to improve the accuracy of market prices. See Christie, 198 U.S. at 249 (“[T]he quotations
of prices from the market are of the utmost importance to the business world, and not least to
the farmers . . . .”); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the information arbitrage model).
75. See Christie, 198 U.S. at 249 (“Purchases made with the understanding that the con-
tract will be settled by paying the difference between the contract and the market price at a
certain time stand on different ground from purchases made merely with the expectation that
they will be satisfied by set-off.”) (citation omitted). See generally Patterson, supra note 51, at
863-84 (describing judicial tolerance for futures trading on organized exchanges).
76. See infra notes 277-78 and accompanying text (arguing that the basic policy problem
presented by speculation is filtering out welfare-reducing transactions from more beneficial
forms of trading).
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B. Codifying the Common Law: Antibucketshop Statutes and the
Commodity Exchange Act
Modern legislation has largely replicated, and in important ways
strengthened, the common law rule against difference contracts.
Codification of the rule first began in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, when a large number of state legislatures passed
“antibucketshop” laws declaring contracts for the sale of goods illegal
unless settled by delivery.77 Like the common law, many of these stat-
utes contained exclusions for organized futures trading78 and for in-
demnity agreements where one of the parties could prove a hedging
purpose.79 Unlike the common law, many went beyond merely de-
claring difference contracts to be unenforceable by providing for
criminal sanctions.80
Antibucketshop laws remain on the books in many states.81 Their
influence has waned, however, as the federal government has ex-
tended its own authority in the area.82 Congress first entered the field
in 1921 with the Future Trading Act, reenacted in 1936 as the Com-
modity Exchange Act (CEA).83 The original CEA applied only to fu-
77.  “Bucket shop” was a derogatory term applied to businesses that offered opportunities
to wager on prices without actually delivering the stock or commodity in question. See Gate-
wood v. North Carolina, 203 U.S. 531, 536 (1906). In the typical bucket shop, a customer would
bet on future prices with the bucket shop acting as bookie and matching customer bets against
each other while assuming risks for any net position. See Stein, supra note 69, at 477. See gener-
ally Note, Legislation Effecting Commodity and Stock Exchanges, 45 HARV. L. REV. 912 (1932)
(discussing antibucketshop laws).
78. See Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188, 197 n.3 (1933) (listing state an-
tibucketshop statutes that exempted exchange-traded futures); Note, supra note 77, at 920 n.35
(same).
79. See Note, supra note 77, at 919 n.32 (listing statutes with hedging exceptions).
80. See id. at 917 n.26 (listing statutes that criminalized bucket shops).
81. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 8-1-120 to 8-1-131 (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1651
to 44-1660 (West 1994); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 351 to 351-e (McKinney 1988).
82. Whether and to what extent the Commodity Exchange Act preempts state antibucket-
shop laws is hotly debated. Compare Barry W. Taylor, The Commodity Exchange Act and
Other Bucket Shop Laws: The Future of Commodity Swaps Without Preemption, in THE SWAP
MARKET IN 1990, at 501-47 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No.
689, 1990) (arguing that off-exchange “swaps” agreements might be subject to state antibucket-
shop and gambling laws), and Julie M. Allen, Kicking the Bucket Shop: The Model State Com-
modity Code as the Latest Weapon in the State Administrator’s Anti-Fraud Arsenal, 42 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 889, 891 (1985) (arguing that the CEA authorizes states to enact newly-drafted
model code provisions regulating off-exchange futures and options), with Kevin T. Van Wart,
Preemption and the Commodity Exchange Act, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 657, 657-722 (1982)
(arguing that the CEA preempts application of state laws to off-exchange derivatives trading).
83. The Future Trading Act of 1921 (FTA), Pub. L. No. 67-66, 42 Stat. 187, applied a pro-
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tures and options trading in cotton, grain, and a limited group of
other agricultural commodities.84 In 1974, however, Congress signifi-
cantly expanded the federal sphere of influence by extending the
CEA to “all other goods and articles,” including all “services, rights,
and interests,”85 and creating a five-member Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) charged with enforcing the statute.86 As
a result, federal regulators now play a leading role in curbing specula-
tive trading.
To understand this point, it is essential to recognize that one of
Congress’s primary goals in enacting the CEA was to curb specula-
tion in those goods and services that fall within the CEA’s purview.
As originally enacted, section 5 of the CEA provided that
“[e]xcessive speculation in any commodity under contracts of sale . . .
for future delivery . . . is an undue and unnecessary burden on inter-
state commerce . . . .”87 Thus the centerpiece of the CEA is an
“exchange trading requirement” that reincarnates, in a modified
statutory form, the common law rule requiring contracts of sale for
future delivery to be settled by actual delivery.
The CEA resembles the common law because it prohibits all
contracts of sale for future delivery that are not made on, and subject
to the rules of, an organized exchange.88 This prohibition does not
apply, however, to contracts that are intended to be settled by deliv-
ering the underlying good or service.89 The net result is that trading in
futures and options that are not intended to be settled by delivery is
                                                                                                                                     
hibitive tax to futures trades off organized exchanges. See id., 42 Stat. at 187. The Supreme
Court subsequently held the FTA to be an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power. See
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 63-72 (1922). The statute was subsequently reintroduced and
passed under the Commerce Clause as the Grain Futures Act (GFA) of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-
331, 42 Stat. 998. The GFA was significantly amended and renamed the Commodity Exchange
Act in 1936. See S. REP. NO. 93-1131, at 12-15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843,
5852-56 (discussing the CEA’s history).
84. See S. REP. NO. 93-1131, at 14 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5855.
85. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, §
201(b), 88 Stat. 1389, 1395 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)) (defining the term
“commodity” and providing for CFTC jurisdiction over all options and futures trading in com-
modities); see also Stein, supra note 69, at 485-86 (discussing the meaning of “commodity” un-
der the CEA).
86. See The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, §
101(a)(3), 88 Stat. 1389, 1389-91 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1994)). 
87. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74–675, § 5, 49 Stat. 1491, 1492 (1936).
88. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1) (1994); see also Stein, supra note 69, at 479-82 (describing the
CEA’s exchange trading requirement).
89. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see also Stein, supra note 69, at 486-92 (discussing exemption
for contracts intended to be settled by delivery).
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legally permissible only within the safe harbor of a regulated ex-
change. Off-exchange “difference contracts” are not just unenforce-
able, but illegal under federal law.90
The CEA’s exchange trading requirement—sometimes dubbed a
“ban on off-exchange futures”—thus plays a critical role in curbing
speculative activity in the United States economy. While an extensive
list of contracts are approved for trading on the designated futures
exchanges, for each commodity for which a contract is listed there are
tens of thousands of goods and services not listed.91 Would-be specu-
lators hoping to take a position in the markets for miniskirts, mittens,
Monets, mandarin oranges, management consultants, or Montana
real estate will find that neither these nor most other goods and
services have contracts listed for trading on a designated exchange.
To speculate in these markets one must resign oneself to spot trading,
with all its expense and inconvenience.
Indeed, the CEA in many respects keeps speculators on an even
shorter leash than the common law did. Like many antibucketshop
statutes, the CEA goes beyond the common law rule of civil unen-
forceability to provide for criminal penalties for off-exchange trading
in contracts not settled by delivery.92 (The significance of this sanction
is discussed further in Section IV.E.) Equally important, the CEA
empowers the CFTC to act as a gatekeeper to the exchanges and to
decide which contracts will be accepted for trading. Any exchange
seeking to offer a new type of future or option for trading accordingly
must first demonstrate to the CFTC that the contract is not “contrary
to the public interest”;93 the CFTC has interpreted this dictate to re-
quire a showing that the contract serves some economic purpose be-
yond mere speculation.94 Within the sanctuary of the exchanges, the
CFTC imposes other restrictions to deter speculative transactions.
For example, the CFTC can seek to discourage speculative trading by
imposing “position limits” that restrict the size of the position an in-
90. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 13 (1994) (establishing criminal penalties for off-exchange trading
in contracts not settled by delivery); CFTC v. Noble Metals Int’l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766, 772 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding “Forward Delivery Program contracts” to be illegal off-exchange futures where
traders’ customers did not expect to take actual delivery).
91. See FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, VOLUME OF FUTURES & OPTIONS TRADING
ON U.S. FUTURES EXCHANGES 6-8 (1992) (showing that in 1992, only 52 types of commodities
saw futures trading volume in excess of 100,000 contracts on the United States exchanges).
92. See 7 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
93. Id. § 7.
94. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 5, App. A (1998) (describing the economic purpose requirement);
Stein, supra note 69, at 482 (same).
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dividual trader can take in any particular contract, as well as “trading
limits” that restrict the size of particular transactions.95
The net result is that federal legislation largely replicates, and in
many respects strengthens, the common law’s restrictions on specula-
tion through difference agreements. Although modern observers of-
ten overlook the CEA’s antispeculation function, federal commodi-
ties law plays a fundamental role in channeling our nation’s
entrepreneurial energy away from speculative trading. Part IV re-
turns to consider in greater detail the implications of this role for the
CFTC’s claim of jurisdiction over the market for financial derivatives.
C. Antispeculation Rules in Insurance Law: The Doctrines of
Indemnity and Insurable Interest
The common law rule against difference contracts and the CEA
both deter speculation in a similar fashion: by requiring speculators
outside a regulated futures exchange to incur the costs associated
with spot market delivery. This strategy, it turns out, is mirrored in
insurance law.96 Two doctrines that lie at the heart of insurance—the
requirement of insurable interest and the indemnity principle—have
both evolved, in part, to prevent speculators from using insurance for
speculation.
95. See 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a) (1994) (directing the CFTC to impose limits on the size of traders’
positions and transactions for the purpose of preventing “excessive speculation”). These limits
are not applied to traders who can prove that their transactions hedge against a preexisting
business risk. See id. § 6a(c).
A number of other rules also discourage speculation in futures. For example, a customer
who opens a futures trading account must sign a disclosure statement acknowledging that she
understands the risks involved; she must also characterize the account either as a “trade” (or
“hedge”) account or a “speculative” account. The latter are scrutinized more carefully. See
DARRELL DUFFIE, FUTURES MARKETS 67-70 (1989). Moreover, because exchange-traded fu-
tures and option contracts must include standardized terms regarding such matters as delivery
date, contract size, and so forth, they are of limited value to many would-be speculators. For
example, a trader who thinks wheat prices will rise 12 months hence cannot speculate through
futures or options that expire in six months. See MEHRAJ MATTOO, STRUCTURED DE-
RIVATIVES 13-14 (1997) (“[A]ll futures contracts and exchange traded options have fixed at-
tributes in terms of delivery dates, contract size, strike rates and so on. Such derivatives cannot,
therefore, be tailored to specific hedging or investment requirements.”).
96. An insurance policy is essentially an “option” in which the buyer pays a fixed fee for
the right to profit if certain events occur. Thus the requirement that off-exchange contracts of
sale be settled by delivery would be seriously undermined if speculators could use insurance to
accomplish similar results. Consider the example of a speculator precluded from betting on lo-
cal real estate prices through difference agreements who instead purchased a policy “insuring”
nearby homes against a decline in market value. If the policy were enforceable, the speculator
would reap a profit if prices fell without ever buying or selling a single property.
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There are several different tests for determining whether a poli-
cyholder has an “insurable interest.”97 As a general rule, however,
courts refuse to enforce an insurance policy unless the policyholder
can demonstrate that she would suffer some significant economic
detriment if the insured property is destroyed.98 Thus, the owner of an
automobile has an insurable interest in her car, and her bank also
may be able to purchase a policy if it financed the purchase and holds
a collateral interest in the vehicle. Neither the owner nor the bank,
however, can purchase a policy on some third party’s vehicle.
Even for policyholders who hold insurable interests, recovery
will be limited by a second antispeculation rule: the indemnity princi-
ple. Under the indemnity rules, a policyholder cannot recover any
amount exceeding the economic value of her interest in the insured
property.99 An automobile owner whose car is destroyed can recover
the fair market value of the vehicle, but can not recover three times
that amount even if she has purchased and paid for three policies.
Similarly, her bank can recover only the amount of its unpaid loan.
The doctrines of indemnity and insurable interest arose in the
earliest days of insurance law100 and persist, often in statutory form, to
this day.101 Both reflect an axiom of insurance so fundamental that it
goes to very meaning of the word: insurance policies are to compen-
sate for losses suffered—not to generate profits.102 Two evils are
97. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 195-200 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW]; Samuel A.
Rea, Jr., The Economics of Insurance Law, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 145, 146-51 (1993); Wil-
liam T. Vukowich, Insurable Interest: When It Must Exist in Property and Life Insurance, 7
WILLAMETTE L.J. 1, 1-42 (1971). The discussion below focuses on the rules of property insur-
ance. Somewhat different doctrines apply in the case of life insurance, reflecting policy con-
cerns outside the moral hazard and speculation issues addressed here.
98. See ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW, supra note 97, at 199.
99. See id.; Rea, supra note 97, at 151-53. A limited exception exists in some states for
“value” policies that specify the value of the property insured. See generally ABRAHAM,
INSURANCE LAW, supra note 97, at 263-64 (describing value policies).
100. See 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF
ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 469 (1992) (identifying the insurable interest
doctrine in the earliest records of English law).
101. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.030 (Michie 1998) (declaring that a policy without in-
surable interest is void; indemnity is limited to amount of insurable interest); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 20-1105 (1990) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2706 (1989) (same); see also ABRAHAM,
INSURANCE LAW, supra note 97, at 195-200 (discussing indemnity and insurable interest in the
modern context).
102. See, e.g., Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731, 739 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasizing
that “the legitimate object of insurance is to provide reimbursement for loss—and nothing
more”); see also ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW, supra note 97, at 199 (stressing that “the pur-
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thought to flow from using insurance policies for gain. The first is
“moral hazard,” a picturesque phrase referring to the fear that insur-
ance might tempt policyholders into not protecting adequately
against losses, or even destroying insured property for profit.103 The
second fundamental concern underlying the indemnity and insurable
interest requirements, however, is the fear that speculators otherwise
would use insurance policies to wager on the future.104
Both early and modern insurance cases frequently cite the anti-
speculation function of the indemnity and insurable interest rules,105
as does academic commentary dating well into the mid-twentieth
century.106 More recently, however, scholars have shown a curious
reluctance to credit the traditional antispeculation rationale, instead
emphasizing moral hazard as the rules’ underlying foundation.107 The
very structure of the indemnity and insurable interest rules never-
theless reveals that they are at least as much concerned with discour-
aging speculation as they are with avoiding moral hazard. In some
                                                                                                                                     
pose of insurance is to protect the insured against suffering a loss, not to create the opportunity
for gain”).
103. See Vukowich, supra note 97, at 8-9 (describing insurable interest as a means of dis-
couraging insureds from destroying lives and property); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DIS-
TRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 137 (1986) [hereinafter
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK] (describing the indemnity rule as a guard against moral haz-
ard).
104. See ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 103, at 137 (noting that the antiwa-
gering rationale is the oldest justification for indemnity rules); Vukowich, supra note 97, at 6-8
(identifying the antiwagering policy which underlies insurable interest).
105. See, e.g., Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881) (holding that a policy held by a
party without an insurable interest is unenforceable as “a wager policy, or a mere speculative
contract”); Brockway v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 9 F. 249, 254 (W.D. Pa. 1881) (stating
that policies purchased by individuals who lack insurable interest are “speculative insurance,”
and that the law does not sanction insurance “obtained for the purpose of speculation upon . . .
hazard”); Helmetag’s Adm’x v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183, 186 (1884) (stating that “‘wager policies’ . .
. are entitled to no higher dignity, in the eye of the law, than gambling speculations”); Cross-
man v. American Ins. Co. of Newark, 164 N.W. 428, 429 (Mich. 1917) (finding that “[p]olicies
of insurance founded upon mere hope and expectation and without some interest in the prop-
erty, or the life insured, are objectional as a species of gambling”). For an example of a modern
case, see Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Receconi, 827 P.2d 118, 130 (N.M. 1992) (noting that a
lack of insurable interest “encourag[es] speculation”).
106. See, e.g., Vukowich, supra note 97, at 8-9 (discussing antiwagering policy).
107. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 23, at 107-08 (discounting the antiwagering argument
and favoring moral hazard as the best explanation for indemnity and insurable interest rules);
Rea, supra note 97, at 146-47, 151 (noting, but rejecting, the antiwagering explanation for the
indemnity and insurable interest rules); see also ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW, supra note 97, at
199 (noting that while the indemnity principle originated in the desire to prevent use of policies
for speculation, “[t]he predominant justification now given for the requirement is that it com-
bats moral hazard”).
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situations, for example, the requirement of insurable interest actually
magnifies moral hazard problems. Consider the case of an insurance
company that sells policies against damage from earthquakes or hur-
ricanes. No policyholder is likely to be able to alter the chances of
such a natural disaster occurring. A property owner can, however,
take steps to limit any resulting damage through such preventative
measures as reinforcing brickwork or storing valuables securely. If
moral hazard was insurance law’s principal concern, it would make
more sense to allow insurance companies to sell earthquake and hur-
ricane policies to third parties than to property owners. Yet in the in-
terest of discouraging speculation, the rules of insurable interest dic-
tate exactly the opposite result.
Another aspect of the indemnity and insurable interest rules that
highlights their antispeculation origins is the fact that neither rule is
waivable.108 Suppose a homeowner wants to violate the indemnity
principle by taking out a policy that would pay three times her
home’s value in the event of its destruction. The insurance company
could insist on a variety of terms (such as exclusions for arson) to
protect itself against moral hazard. Moreover, to the extent moral
hazard could not be eliminated entirely, the company could charge a
higher premium. If no third parties are harmed, why not let the com-
pany sell the policy?109
As in the case of the rule against difference agreements, the doc-
trines of indemnity and insurable interest are curiously unyielding le-
gal barriers to contract—even contracts entered by legally competent
and mutually consenting parties. This inflexibility seems unjustified if
moral hazard is the law’s primary concern. Nonwaivability makes
sense, however, if the insurable interest and indemnity rules are in-
tended to protect society from the detrimental effects of speculation,
as well as to protect insurance companies from their policyholders’
misbehavior.
108. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 287 (1995) (stating that “[e]very stipulation in a policy of
insurance for the payment of loss whether the person has or has not any interest . . . is void”);
Ben Kennedy & Assocs. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 318, 319-20 (10th Cir. 1994) (refusing to
enforce an agreement where both parties to a contract intended the policyholder to recover
upon the happening of a contingent event without suffering actual loss); Brown v. J.C. Penney
Cas. Co., 649 F. Supp. 22, 23 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (observing that the requirement of an insurable
interest is not waivable).
109. See Brockway, 9 F. at 254 (positing that an insurable interest is required “not in the
interests of insurance companies,” but out of concern for “good morals and sound public pol-
icy”); see also Rea, supra note 97, at 155-58 (discussing the indemnity and insurable interest
rules as a response to concern for third parties).
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D. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The rule against difference contracts, the CEA’s ban on off-
exchange futures, and the insurance requirements of indemnity and
insurable interest all force individuals who wish to wager on market
prices to incur the transportation, carrying, and liquidity costs associ-
ated with doing business in the spot market. This makes speculative
trading in most goods and services far more difficult and expensive.
However, there is one spot market where transportation, carrying,
and liquidity costs are inherently negligible: the market for corporate
securities.
Corporate stocks and bonds are cheap to transport and almost
costless to store. Because lenders readily accept them as collateral,
buyers often can borrow the money needed to buy them, avoiding
much sacrifice of liquidity. As a result, the spot market for corporate
securities offers a safe haven for speculators driven from other spot
markets by high transaction costs. It is far easier to bet on petroleum
prices by buying stock in Exxon than by hoarding fuel oil.
Not surprisingly, securities markets have long been associated
with speculation. This association, moreover, has long troubled law-
makers. Although movements to curb stock market speculation date
back at least to the beginning of the twentieth century,110 it was not
until the market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression that
Congress decided to take action. The result was the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (SEA).111
The SEA is not usually thought of as an antispeculation law.
Nevertheless, curbing stock speculation was one of Congress’s pri-
mary goals in passing that statute.112 Rampant speculation was be-
lieved to be a root cause of both the 1929 market crash and the hard
110. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 394-407 (1990). For example, in 1908 President Theodore Roosevelt
urged Congress to adopt measures to prevent “at least the grosser forms of gambling in securi-
ties,” which he viewed as “pernicious to the body politic.” Id. at 396 (quoting 42 CONG. REC.
1347, 1349 (1908)). Similarly, in 1912 a report by the House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency found that speculative trading dominated the business of the stock exchange and that
“[s]uch excessive and indiscriminate speculation . . . is not only hurtful in the way that all public
gambling is hurtful, but in addition it withdraws from productive industry vast quantities of
capital.” Id. at 403 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 45 (1913)).
111. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll (1994)).
112. See Thel, supra note 110, at 395-424 (concluding that discouraging excessive specula-
tion was a driving motive behind the passage of the 1934 Act).
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times that followed.113 Section 2 of the SEA accordingly describes the
need for regulation as follows:
[T]ransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national
public interest . . . . Frequently the prices of securities on such ex-
changes and markets are susceptible to . . . excessive speculation, re-
sulting in sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in the prices of secu-
rities . . . . National emergencies . . . are precipitated, intensified, and
prolonged by . . . sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of securities
prices and by excessive speculation . . . .114
Like judges in difference contract cases, the 1934 Congress asso-
ciated speculation with specific economic harms. Thus the House
Reports accompanying the SEA condemned stock speculation as a
nonproductive activity that drained credit and other valuable re-
sources away from “other more desirable uses of commerce and in-
dustry.”115 A second familiar concern highlighted in the legislative his-
tory was the fear that speculation produced “wide fluctuations in the
price of securities, which ultimately imperiled the holdings of bona
fide investors of every type.”116
Dedicated to curbing stock speculation in principle, in practice
Congress found it difficult to design policies that would rein in
speculators without also discouraging “legitimate” stock transac-
113. See S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 3 (1934) (“Excessive [stock] speculation has caused acute
suffering and demoralization. . . . [It has also] brought in its train social and economic evils
which have affected the security and prosperity of the entire country.”). President Franklin D.
Roosevelt wrote Congress to urge that it regulate the securities market because “[t]he people
of this country are, in overwhelming majority, fully aware of the fact that unregulated specula-
tion in securities and in commodities was one of the most important contributing factors in the
artificial and unwarranted ‘boom’ which had so much to do with the terrible conditions of the
years following 1929.” Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, to Sam Rayburn, Chair-
man, House Interstate & Foreign Commerce Committee (Mar. 26, 1934), quoted in H.R. REP.
NO. 73-1383, at 2 (1934).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
115. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 8 (1934); see also S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 3 (1934) (finding
that stock speculation siphoned credit “from agriculture, commerce and industry”); STAFF OF
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, A REVIEW AND
EVALUATION OF FEDERAL MARGIN REGULATIONS 118 (1984) [hereinafter REVIEW OF
FEDERAL MARGIN REGULATIONS] (describing one main objective of the 1934 Act as prevent-
ing the diversion of credit from productive uses into stock speculation).
116. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 11 (1934). The notion that speculation caused price bubbles
seemed, of course, especially compelling to a legislature sitting five years after the 1929 mar-
ket’s spectacular rise and fall.
STOUT TO PRINTER 04/15/99  4:22 PM
730 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol:48:701
tions.117 One strategy eventually adopted to attack speculative excess
was to impose “margin requirements” limiting investors’ ability to
borrow to buy stocks.118 Thus section 7 of the SEA directs the Federal
Reserve Board to limit stock traders’ ability to borrow money from
banks or brokers to fund their speculations.119 Under present rules,
investors can borrow no more than 50% of the funds they use to pur-
chase corporate equities.120
A second provision of the SEA designed to curb speculation
places restrictions on “short selling”—that is, selling borrowed
stock.121 The 1934 Congress believed that short selling encouraged
speculation,122 and concern about “shorting” played a central role in
the hearings surrounding the SEA’s passage.123 Section 10(a) of the
Act directs the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue
rules that restrict short selling.124 One interesting result is Rule 10a-1,
also known as the “uptick rule,” which bans short sales except after a
stock’s price has risen.125
117. See Thel, supra note 110, at 423 (noting the perceived difficulty of designing substan-
tive rules that would distinguish undesirable speculative trading from legitimate activity); see
also infra note 171 (distinguishing speculation from investment).
118. Margin trading was widely believed to have encouraged speculation in the 1929 mar-
ket by allowing traders to take large positions with relatively small commitments of personal
funds. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 9 (1934) (discussing the effects of the crash on margin
traders).
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1994) (directing the Federal Reserve to impose margin require-
ments).
120. Regulation T does not permit investors to borrow more than 50% of a stock purchase
from a securities firm. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.18(a) (1998). Other regulations limit the abilities of
banks and other firms to lend to investors. See REVIEW OF FEDERAL MARGIN REGULATIONS,
supra note 115, at 47-50.
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (1994). See generally Jonathan R. Macey et al., Restrictions on
Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and Its Role In View of the October 1987 Stock
Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799 (1989) (describing short selling rules); David C. Wor-
ley, The Regulation of Short Sales: The Long and Short of It, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1255 (1990)
(same).
122. See Thel, supra note 110, at 410, 432. Short selling is associated with speculation be-
cause a short seller can profit only if he can sell the borrowed stock at a higher price than he
must pay when the time comes to repurchase it and return it to the lender. Short sales thus
amount to bearish bets on stock declines.
123. See Macey et al., supra note 121, at 801-02 (stressing the importance Congress placed
on the role of short selling in the market crash of 1929).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (1994).
125. See Short Sales, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1998). Adopted by the SEC shortly after pas-
sage of the 1934 Act, the uptick rule prohibits short selling unless it occurs at a price higher
than the last reported market price (an “uptick”), or at a market price which is higher than the
last reported, different price. See Macey et al., supra note 121, at 803-04. The uptick rule’s an-
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In practice, it is unclear how effective margin requirements and
shorts sales restrictions are in discouraging stock speculation. Margin
requirements ignore the fungibility of credit,126 while the uptick rule
allows short selling after even a brief price increase.127 Perhaps more
importantly, stock speculators have recently been able to evade both
restrictions by trading in derivatives whose values mimic those of the
underlying stocks.128
Whether the SEA’s margin requirements and short sales restric-
tions are effective or not, however, they are compelling evidence that
the 1934 Congress believed both that speculators are endemic in the
spot market for securities, and that they work much mischief there.129
The rules also reveal a legislative determination to curb stock specu-
lation through substantive restrictions where necessary. Indeed, they
                                                                                                                                     
tispeculation purpose is reflected in its exceptions. For example, it does not apply to a seller
who “owns the security sold and intends to deliver such security as soon as is possible.” 17
C.F.R. § 240.10a-1(e)(1) (1996). This exception appears to distinguish between an investor who
wants to close out a position in the cash market as soon as possible and needs to borrow the
security for settlement, and a speculator who simply wants to wager on a market downturn. See
Macey et al., supra note 121, at 808-11 (discussing the exemptions from the uptick rule for cer-
tain hedging transactions).
Other rules also restrict short selling. See id. at 812 (noting that short selling is subject to
more severe regulation than other forms of trading). Short sellers, for example, are subject to
higher margin requirements. See id. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act also forbids corporate offi-
cers, directors, and large shareholders from selling short. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994). Until re-
cently, many institutional investors were also deterred from short selling by the belief that they
would suffer severe tax penalties on any profits earned by short selling. See Vineeta Anand,
Pension Funds May Sell Short: IRS Move is Expected to Boost Use of Market-Neutral Strategies,
PENSION & INVESTMENT, Jan. 9, 1995, at 1.
126. For example, speculators banned from borrowing more than 50% of their stock pur-
chases from their brokers may be able to easily fund their acquisitions by taking out home eq-
uity loans or increasing credit card debt.
127. This curious asymmetry reflects historical context. Short selling was thought to have
exacerbated the 1929 crash by creating a ready vehicle for fearful speculators to bet on their
pessimistic predictions. See Macey et al., supra note 121, at 801 (discussing how the 1929 crash
led to concerns over short selling). In adopting Rule 10a-1, the SEC accordingly focused only
on preventing “demoralizing” speculation. See SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF
SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 2, at 251 (1963) (noting that short sales re-
strictions were intended to discourage only “demoralizing” speculation). Thus, the uptick rule
seeks to prevent speculative bubbles from bursting, rather than to hinder their formation in the
first place.
128. See Worley, supra note 121, at 1268-69 (describing how stock derivatives allow traders
to evade short sales restrictions).
129. See Thel, supra note 110, at 385 (arguing that Section 10(b) of the SEA was primarily
intended not to protect investors from fraud, but “to empower the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to regulate any practice that might contribute to speculation in securities”);
see also infra note 306 (describing how the SEA’s disclosure provisions may discourage specu-
lation by encouraging subjective agreement).
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flatly prohibit certain transactions deemed too closely tied to specula-
tion.130
These observations highlight a curious phenomenon: many con-
temporary scholars and policymakers appear to have forgotten the
SEA’s antispeculation goals. Instead, conventional wisdom now
views the SEA as first and foremost a disclosure statute. Thus the Su-
preme Court has opined that “the fundamental purpose of the 1934
Act [is] ‘to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philoso-
phy of caveat emptor,’”131 while academics have asserted that the
dominating principle of federal securities regulation “is that anyone
willing to disclose the right things can sell or buy whatever he wants
at whatever price the market will sustain.”132
This modern perception of the SEA is in tension with the Act’s
language and its history. Section 2 of the SEA, in describing the Act’s
purposes, refers twice to “excessive speculation” but does not even
mention disclosure of information.133 Similarly, a recent historical
study of the SEA concluded that “in 1934 there was a widespread
consensus that excessive stock market speculation and the collapse of
the stock market had brought down the economy [and] those who
enacted the Exchange Act were primarily concerned with preventing
130. These spot market restraints, it should be noted, are unique to securities. An optimistic
speculator who wants to “go long” by buying fine art or beachfront property is free to use his
purchase as collateral for as large a loan as the bank is willing to give him, just as a pessimist is
free to borrow such assets to sell short when prices are falling. Practical obstacles limit short
selling in most spot markets outside the market for securities, however. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 219-23.
131. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).
132. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 670 (1984). The heterogeneous expectations model of specu-
lation suggests that mandatory disclosure rules may in fact discourage stock speculation by
providing investors with uniform information that encourages homogeneous expectations. See
Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities
Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 695-97 (1995) [hereinafter Stout, Casinos] (arguing that man-
datory disclosure may reduce heterogeneous expectations). As a rule, however, modern schol-
ars describe the SEA’s disclosure provisions not as one of many statutory means toward the
end of reducing speculation, but as the SEA’s singular purpose. See Easterbrook & Fischel, su-
pra, at 670. Disclosure in turn is usually defended as essential to the “accuracy enhancement”
of stock prices. Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK.
L. REV. 763, 764-65 (1995). But see generally Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Effi-
cient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 613, 692-95 (1988) (arguing that accurate securities prices may not provide as much eco-
nomic benefit as is commonly assumed).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
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a recurrence.”134 Concern for excessive stock speculation nevertheless
seems to have largely disappeared from the agendas of modern secu-
rities scholars and policymakers.135
E. Summary: The Prevalence of Antispeculation Law
“Antispeculation law” generally is not taught as a subject in the
modern legal curriculum. Perhaps it ought to be, for hostility towards
speculators appears to be a fundamental characteristic of American
law. The rule against difference contracts, the CEA, the doctrines of
indemnity and insurable interest, and the SEA’s margin requirements
and short sales restrictions each play important roles in deterring
speculative trading. They are, however, only a few of the many legal
doctrines that work to rein in speculators. A policy of discouraging
speculative trafficking in legal claims lies at the heart of the doctrine
of champerty, the common law prohibition against buying and selling
lawsuits that survives in statutory form in most states.136 The Internal
Revenue Code also deters speculation by limiting preferential capital
gains treatment of income earned from the sale of assets to those
held for some minimum period (under current law, one year).137 This
discourages speculation in spot markets outside the CFTC’s jurisdic-
tion, including not only the spot market for corporate securities—
already subject to the SEA’s margin requirements and short sales re-
strictions—but also spot markets for fine art, real estate, and other
tangible assets. Although modern observers often attribute the
holding period requirement to concerns over inflation, income aver-
aging, and “lock in” effects,138 legislative history indicates that Con-
134. Thel, supra note 110, at 409.
135. Instead, debate in the legal literature has focused primarily on the wisdom and neces-
sity of mandatory disclosure rules. See, e.g., Symposium, Contemporary Problems in Securities
Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 545 (1984) (discussing modern securities regulation).
136. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 1998); cf. Ari Dobner, Note, Litigation for
Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1543-55 (1996) (discussing the history of and the policy behind
champerty laws). Another common law rule reflecting antispeculation bias is the “prudent per-
son” standard applied to trustees, which has been interpreted to preclude speculation. See Mi-
chael T. Johnson, Note, Speculating on the Efficacy of “Speculation”: An Analysis of the Pru-
dent Person’s Slipperiest Term of Art In Light of Modern Portfolio Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV.
419, 419-20 (1996).
137. See I.R.C. § 1222 (1998). This rule applies to income earned from the sale of “capital
assets,” generally defined as property not used in a taxpayer’s trade or business. Id.
138. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 116-22 (5th ed. 1987)
(describing holding period requirement as responding to inflation, income averaging, and lock
in effects).
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gress adopted the requirement to reward long-term “investment”
while discouraging short-term “speculation.”139
Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
American judges and legislators appear to have followed a policy of
actively and deliberately discouraging speculative transactions. Re-
cent years have seen a curious development, however. Lawmakers’
longstanding belief that speculation is harmful seems to be eroding.
Although antispeculation rules remain a staple of American law, con-
temporary observers seem increasingly reluctant to subscribe to the
notion that deterring speculation should be a goal of public policy.
Thus academics routinely offer alternative justifications for such tra-
ditional antispeculation rules as the SEA (now described as a disclo-
sure statute) or insurance law’s indemnity principle (now explained
as a response to moral hazard).140
What explains this modern skepticism towards antispeculation
laws? The answer may lie in economic theory’s growing influence on
legal thinking. Judges and legislators traditionally condemned
speculators as nonproductive parasites whose trading destabilizes
market prices and often brings financial ruin to speculators them-
selves. Contemporary economic theory, however, describes specula-
tors in far more flattering terms. Thus the next Part of this Article
turns to prevailing economic theories of speculation and the modern
notion that speculators serve the economic goal of allocative effi-
ciency.
139. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 77-1631, at 50 (1942) (noting that the holding period requirement
would be a “deterrent to the speculator as contrasted with the legitimate investor”); STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 426 (Comm. Print 1976) (same). The Committee staff explained that
the holding period requirement favors gains from investment over speculative profits, because:
[A] person who holds an asset for only a short period of time is primarily interested
in obtaining quick gains from short-term market fluctuations, which is a distinctively
speculative activity. . . . [While] the person who holds an asset for a long time proba-
bly is interested fundamentally in the income from his investment and in the long-
term appreciation value.
Id.; see also infra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between invest-
ment and speculation).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 105-09, 131-35.
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II. CONVENTIONAL ECONOMIC THEORIES OF SPECULATION: THE
RISK HEDGING AND INFORMATION ARBITRAGE MODELS
An extensive economic literature discusses the phenomenon of
speculation.141 The exact meaning of the term, however, has proven
remarkably elusive. Theorists generally use the word “speculator” to
refer to someone who purchases an asset with the intent of quickly
reselling it, or sells an asset with the intent of quickly repurchasing
it.142 This approach distinguishes speculators from those who trade in
goods and services because they produce or consume them, and also
may offer a rough means of differentiating short term “speculation”
from long term “investment.”143 Beyond this basic starting point,
modern finance lacks a generally accepted definition.144
Speculation is a slippery concept, in part, because more than one
motive can inspire short-term trading. In fact, the contemporary eco-
nomic literature appears to incorporate two distinct explanations for
speculative trading: risk hedging and information arbitrage.
A. Risk Hedging
In economic parlance, “risk” refers to probabilistic variation in
wealth: chances of gains, as well as of losses.145 Economic theory holds
141. See, e.g., Jean-Pierre Danthine, Information, Futures Prices, and Stabilizing Specula-
tion, 17 J. ECON. THEORY 79 (1978); Sanford Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz, On The Impossibil-
ity of Informationally Efficient Markets, AM. ECON. REV., June 1980, at 393; Oliver D. Hart &
David M. Kreps, Price Destabilizing Speculation, 94 J. POL. ECON. 927 (1986); Albert S. Kyle,
Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition, 56 REV. ECON. STUD. 317 (1989); John
Leach, Rational Speculation, 99 J. POL. ECON. 131 (1991).
142. See Martin S. Fridson, Exactly What Do You Mean by Speculation?, J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT., Fall 1993, at 29.
143. See infra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing speculation and investment).
144. See Fridson, supra note 142, at 29-30 (noting the lack of a universally accepted defini-
tion of the term “speculation”); Hart & Kreps, supra note 141, at 928 (same); Johnson, supra
note 136, at 420 (same). This lack of precision creates difficulties when legal rules treat
“speculative” transactions differently from nonspeculative ones. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.1221-2
(1998) (attaching different tax consequences to speculative and hedging transactions); see also
GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 102 (lamenting the lack of a “clear distinction between deal-
ing activities, speculative activities, and hedging and other risk-management activities” using
derivatives); Johnson, supra note 136, at 420 (noting that the lack of clear understanding of
what is speculation “often creates paralyzing uncertainty for trustees”). Part III suggests that
finding a generally accepted definition of “speculation” has proven to be something of an en-
during puzzle for economic theory because one of the pieces—the heterogeneous expectations
approach—has been missing.
145. Consider the choice between either receiving a quarter with certainty, or tossing the
coin “double or nothing.” Because a 50% chance of receiving 50 cents has an expected value of
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that people generally dislike risk, and are willing to pay to avoid it
(hence the insurance industry).146 The flip side of risk aversion is that
individuals with greater tolerance for risk can, like insurance compa-
nies, reap profits by accepting risks others pay to avoid. According to
the risk hedging model of speculation, speculators are just such rela-
tively risk-neutral traders.147
Consider the classic example of the wheat farmer whose crop
will soon be ready for harvest. If the farmer is risk averse—more
concerned about the chance that prices will fall than the chance that
they will rise—she might prefer to sell her crop now at a slight dis-
count, and deliver it thirty days hence. Conversely, a more risk-
neutral wheat speculator might purchase such a contract because the
price discount creates a “risk premium” that compensates him for ac-
cepting the chance of future price changes.148
As this scenario suggests, the risk hedging model implies that
speculative trades generally involve “hedgers” on one side of the
transaction, and “speculators” on the other.149 A second important
implication is that both parties regard themselves as better off after
trading than they were before. Risk-averse hedgers are happy to pay
to avoid the price variation inherent in holding assets, while more
risk-neutral speculators are happy to be paid a premium to assume
that risk.150 Thus the risk hedging model is consistent with the
                                                                                                                                     
25 cents, both options offer the same probable return. The second option is riskier than the
first, however.
146. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 12-13 (contending that “most people are risk averse
most of the time”).
147. See id. at 54-55 (describing risk hedging). This time-honored theory is often associated
with John Maynard Keynes and John Hicks, among others. See Jack Hirshleifer, The Theory of
Speculation under Alternative Regimes of Markets, 32 J. FIN. 975, 975 & n.1 (1977) [hereinafter
Hirshleifer, Theory of Speculation] (citing JOHN R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL 137-39 (2d
ed. 1946); 2 JOHN M. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY, ch. 29 (1930)).
148. This risk premium implies that although risk-bearing speculators may lose money on
some trades, over time the average speculator should be able to reap risky, but certain, profits.
See infra text accompanying notes 167-71 (defining risk and uncertainty).
149. Alternatively, a risk hedging trade may involve a hedger on both sides, as when a
wheat farmer sells futures to a cereal manufacturer that uses wheat as a productive input. The
risk hedging model does not explain, however, trades between two speculators. See infra text
accompanying note 171 (discussing how the heterogeneous expectations approach can explain
speculator-with-speculator trading).
150. A third, similarly symbiotic explanation of speculation occasionally found in the fi-
nance literature is the liquidity dealing approach. Because people value and are willing to pay
for liquidity, a trader willing to maintain inventory can extract profits by offering to buy at a
slightly lower price than he offers to sell, thus creating a “bid-ask spread” that compensates him
for the risks and costs of keeping inventory. A classic example might be the used car dealer,
who offers liquidity (for a price) to those too impatient to buy and sell through the classified
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“invisible hand” view of markets in which voluntary exchange is pre-
sumed to reallocate resources in a fashion that benefits both the
trading parties and society as a whole.
B. Information Arbitrage
In addition to the risk hedging theory, the economic literature
frequently incorporates a second model of speculative trading: the in-
formation arbitrage model.151 The information arbitrage approach de-
scribes speculators as traders whose research helps them to predict
future changes in prices. Armed with superior knowledge, they then
trade on favorable terms with less-informed buyers and sellers who
are trading for other reasons. Thus a wheat speculator who collects
data on the regional harvest might discover a brewing shortage that
presages a price rise and then profit by buying wheat from less well
informed farmers.
Like the risk hedging approach, the information arbitrage model
implies that speculators need nonspeculators (for example, wheat
farmers and consumers) with whom to trade. Thus the information
arbitrage model does not address the scenario where an optimistic
speculator who believes he has superior information about future
prices buys from a pessimistic speculator who believes she has supe-
rior information about future prices. (Such speculator-with-
speculator trading is discussed in greater detail in Part III.) The in-
formation arbitrage model also resembles the risk hedging model in
predicting that information arbitrage speculators should, on average,
profit from their trades. Indeed, in theory superior information about
future prices should allow information arbitrage speculators to reap
risky but certain152 profits: for example, a trader who accurately pre-
dicts a probable rise in the price of wheat can lock in profits by buy-
ing wheat while also buying a “put” option that insures against the
unlikely event of a price decline by giving the speculator the option
                                                                                                                                     
ads. See, e.g., Hart & Kreps, supra note 141, at 928 (developing a model of consumers and
speculators where “speculation is synonymous with storage”). Like the risk hedging model, the
liquidity dealing model of speculation implies that speculators trade with nonspeculators, and
that speculators generally make money at their counterparties’ expense. Like the risk hedging
model, the liquidity dealing approach also predicts that both sides nevertheless benefit from
trading.
151. This approach is often associated with a classic article by Grossman and Stiglitz, On
the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, supra note 141; see also POSNER, supra
note 23, at 54-55 (describing speculation on superior information); Danthine, supra note 141, at
84-85 (same); Kyle, supra note 141, 341-42 (same).
152. See infra text accompanying notes 167-71 (distinguishing risk and uncertainty).
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to sell at today’s prices. Thus trading on truly superior information is
described herein as a form of “arbitrage,” in which the trader arbi-
trages between time periods, rather than between markets.
The information arbitrage approach parts company with the risk
hedging model, however, by suggesting that trading between specula-
tors and nonspeculators may not necessarily benefit both parties.
(One can see how uninformed farmers might prefer not to trade at a
disadvantage against savvier speculators.) Yet society still benefits
from information arbitrageurs’ trades. Arbitrageurs ferret out infor-
mation that indicates whether prevailing prices are “too low” (a
shortage is developing that will raise prices) or “too high” (a surplus
will soon depress prices). By buying when prices are low and selling
when prices are high, they tend to move prices in the “correct” direc-
tion. Thus, for example, if arbitrageurs buy wheat in times of a
brewing shortage, prices rise and farmers respond by planting more
wheat, helping to reduce the shortage. In economic parlance, infor-
mation arbitrage contributes to “pricing” or “informational” effi-
ciency,153 which in turn promotes allocative efficiency.
It is important to note that these pricing benefits can be exagger-
ated. Information arbitrageurs must invest time and money to ac-
quire superior information about future prices, and these research
costs are ultimately borne by their less-informed counterparties. Thus
there is no guarantee that the private cost of arbitrageurs’ informa-
tion gathering will always be outweighed by its public benefit in
terms of an improved allocation of society’s scarce resources.154 The
information arbitrage model nevertheless supports the claim that
“speculation is efficient” by predicting that speculators help prices re-
flect supply and demand more accurately.
153. See supra note 132 (discussing informational efficiency in securities markets).
154. See Hirshleifer, Information and Invention, supra note 29, at 567-69. Consider the
example of information that allows an arbitrageur to forecast with certainty that a particular
company’s assets will be destroyed within minutes by a huge meteorite. Assume that no steps
can be taken to prevent, or even alleviate, the loss. The ability to predict the meteorite has no
social value, because acquiring the information does not permit society to allocate resources
more efficiently. The prediction nevertheless has substantial private value to the arbitrageur
who can extract wealth from uninformed traders by “shorting” the company’s stock. See supra
notes 121-28 and accompanying text (describing short selling). Thus the arbitrageur might in-
vest substantial resources in meteorite prediction, even if such expenditures are wasteful from a
social perspective.
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C. Summary: Normative Implications of Conventional Theories
The risk hedging and information arbitrage models of specula-
tion rely on diverging explanations of why someone might expect to
profit from buying, and then quickly reselling, goods or services. Both
models imply, however, that speculative trading furthers efficiency,
either by shifting risk between parties in a fashion that generates mu-
tual gains (risk hedging), or by improving market prices’ accuracy as
barometers of future supply and demand (information arbitrage).
Given this result, it should come as no surprise that economics schol-
ars frequently rise to defend the honor of the speculator,155 or that
economic theory is seen as generally supporting speculative trading.156
Yet if theory blesses the speculator, why has the law historically
condemned him? The unflattering perceptions of speculators de-
scribed in Part I seem to conflict directly with the risk hedging and
information arbitrage models. The idea that speculation is
“nonproductive,” for example, seems inconsistent with both theories,
as both assert that speculation promotes efficiency. The belief that
speculators “derange” prices flies in the face of the information arbi-
trage theory’s claim that speculators improve price accuracy. And the
notion that speculation increases the incidence of poverty, while
crafted by judges untutored in the language of modern economics,
can be interpreted as an assertion that speculation increases the level
of risk found in the market—directly contradicting the risk hedging
model’s prediction that speculation effectively reduces risk by reallo-
cating it to those who can bear it most easily.157
The result is a remarkable clash between modern economic
thinking and the legal tradition of hostility towards speculators.158
This conflict has led many contemporary policymakers and scholars
to become increasingly reluctant to support legal rules that deter
155. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 23, at 54 (arguing that speculators perform “a valuable
economic function”).
156. In the ongoing debate over derivatives, for example, champions of derivatives have
relied strongly on the claim that derivatives trading reduces risk and improves the accuracy of
market prices. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
157. This idea also seems inconsistent with the risk hedging and information arbitrage
models’ prediction that speculators on average profit from trading. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 148 (describing how risk-accepting speculators are paid a risk premium) and 152
(noting that information arbitrageurs should earn trading profits).
158. The apparent clash between economic theory and lawmakers’ perceptions is not ab-
solute. For example, the indemnity exception to the rule against difference contracts seems de-
signed to protect transactions that provide insurance benefits of the sort described by the risk
hedging model. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67 (discussing indemnity exception).
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speculative trading. The SEC, for example, has recently questioned
the value of short sales restrictions on the grounds that economic
theory predicts that speculation promotes efficiency.159 Similarly, the
Federal Reserve has rejected the idea that margin limits are neces-
sary to keep stock speculators from diverting credit from more pro-
ductive uses as inconsistent with economic thinking.160 And in the on-
going battle over OTC derivatives, champions of derivatives have
argued that trading should remain unregulated because it reduces
risks and improves the accuracy of market prices.161
In short, contemporary scholars and policymakers seem in-
creasingly inclined to view speculation as a beneficial, rather than
harmful, activity. Yet hostility towards speculators seems too deeply
rooted in the American legal system to comfortably dismiss anti-
speculation laws as inefficient anachronisms. Indeed, the chasm be-
tween modern economic theory and lawmakers’ traditional percep-
tions seems so great as to raise the question: are both discussing the
same phenomenon?
159. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34277, 59 Fed. Reg.
34,885, 34,891 (1994) (stating that short sales regulations can “hinder efficient price discov-
ery”); Worley, supra note 121, at 1255-56, 1268-71 (stating that “the Commission noted that
short selling activities . . . might actually be beneficial in that [they] . . . facilitate[] a decline to a
price that reflect[s] the market’s perception of . . . true value”); see also Sullivan & Long, Inc. v.
Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 860, 862 (7th Cir. 1995) (defending short selling as providing an
“economic service” by moving prices toward their “true value”).
160. Instead, the Federal Reserve now justifies margin requirements as protection against
“systemic risk.” See REVIEW OF FEDERAL MARGIN REGULATIONS, supra note 115, at 2-3, 10-
15. But see id. at 6 (acknowledging that “protection of brokers—or of the market mechanism
more generally—was not a central focus of the writers of securities credit legislation a half cen-
tury ago”).
161. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 7, at 1466; 1513 (defending derivatives
on efficiency grounds and arguing against regulation); Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate
Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the Regulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1, 72 (1994) [hereinafter Markham, Confederate Bonds] (same); Jerry W. Mark-
ham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity Exchange Act: A Call for Alter-
natives, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 53 (1990) [hereinafter Markham, Hybrid Instruments]
(same); Romano, supra note 7, at 5 (same); Stein, supra note 69, at 498 (same). Similarly,
scholars have criticized other antispeculation doctrines on the theory that speculation is eco-
nomically beneficial. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 23, at 487-88 (attacking the SEA’s short
sales restrictions and margin requirements as reducing speculation’s beneficial effects); Dob-
ner, supra note 136, at 1565, 1566 (arguing that the antispeculation policy underlying cham-
perty rule conflicts with the “fact” that “speculation . . . is the cornerstone of our modern capi-
talist economy”); Stout, Casinos, supra note 132, at 699-700 (discussing recent administration
proposals to impose a modest federal tax on trading in corporate equities and raising the possi-
bility that such legislation may be motivated by a desire to curb behavior viewed as undesir-
able).
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III. THE HETEROGENEOUS EXPECTATIONS THEORY OF
SPECULATION
The two conventional theoretical models of speculative trading
surveyed in Part II explain speculation as a consequence of differ-
ences among traders: either differences in their attitudes towards risk
(the risk hedging model), or differences in their willingness to invest
in the information needed to predict future prices (the information
arbitrage model). There is a third type of difference among traders,
however, that may lie closer to the legal culture’s traditional under-
standing of speculation—differences in traders’ subjective expecta-
tions.
A. The Heterogeneous Expectations Approach
The heterogeneous expectations (HE) model of speculation be-
gins with the assumption that individuals’ predictions for future
prices can differ markedly: where a bull believes that prices are sure
to rise, a bear predicts a fall. Disagreement of this sort is a natural
consequence of incomplete and heterogeneous information.162 The in-
formation arbitrage model incorporates the idea of heterogeneous in-
formation to some extent, by hypothesizing that speculators invest in
predictive information that allows them to earn trading profits at the
expense of less well informed counterparties, who are trading for
consumption or other nonspeculative reasons. The information arbi-
trage model fails to account, however, for the possibility that two
speculators who invest in different predictive information might reach
different conclusions about the future.163
1. An Example of Trading Based on Heterogeneous Expectations.
Recognizing that traders who rely on heterogeneous, incomplete sub-
sets of information might make differing predictions for the future
suggests an alternative theory of speculative trading that can perhaps
be most easily understood by considering an archetypal example.
Suppose that, after investigating the gold market, a risk-averse
162. Like other resources, information is often scarce and expensive. As a result, even the
most rational of individuals often acts on incomplete information. Moreover, different indi-
viduals may have ready access to, and rely on, different subsets of incomplete information.
163. Alternatively, two traders who acquire the same information might reach different
conclusions because they interpret the data differently in light of their own past experiences.
This is much the same thing, as traders with differing experiences are effectively relying upon
different subsets of information.
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speculator who has no interest in producing or consuming gold pre-
dicts that there is a 100% chance that today’s gold price of $500 per
ounce will rise to $510 tomorrow. A second, equally risk-averse
speculator who also has researched the market disagrees, and pre-
dicts a 100% chance that prices will fall to $490. The bull perceives an
expected return of $10 per ounce from buying, while the bear sees an
expected return of $10 per ounce from selling. Thus, the bull eagerly
buys while the bear eagerly sells.
As this example demonstrates, traders who share identical risk
preferences and willingness to invest in information nevertheless may
trade voluntarily in assets they neither produce nor consume if they
make differing estimates of the probability distribution of future prices.
In effect, HE speculation is a form of wagering where the gamblers
bet on market prices, rather than on the outcome of a card game or
sporting contest. As Mark Twain once observed, differences of opin-
ion make a horserace.164 The HE theory of speculative trading sug-
gests that differences of opinion also can make a stock market or fu-
tures exchange.
Noneconomists are likely to find the idea of disagreement-based
trading intuitively quite plausible. So has at least one prominent
economist: over two decades ago, Jack Hirshleifer published a series
of papers offering a theory of speculative trading based on differen-
tial beliefs.165 For reasons which are explored further below, however,
Hirshleifer’s approach is rarely mentioned in contemporary discus-
sions of speculation.166 Moreover, Hirshleifer himself did not discuss
164. See SAMUEL L. CLEMONS, PUDD’NHEAD WILSON AND THOSE EXTRAORDINARY
TWINS 92 (Sidney E. Berger ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1980) (1894) (“It were not best that we
should all think alike; it is difference of opinion that makes horse-races.”).
165. See Jack Hirshleifer, Reply To Comments on “Speculation and Equilibrium: Informa-
tion, Risk, and Markets,” 90 Q. J. ECON. 689 (1976); Jack Hirshleifer, Speculation and Equilib-
rium: Information, Risk, and Markets, 89 Q. J. ECON. 519 (1975) [hereinafter Hirshleifer,
Speculation and Equilibrium]; Hirshleifer, Theory of Speculation, supra note 147; see also JACK
HIRSHLEIFER, Two Models of Speculation and Information [hereinafter HIRSHLEIFER, Two
Models], in TIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND INFORMATION 291-300 (1989) (responding to a critique
of the idea of disagreement-based trading). Hirshleifer attributes a similar approach to Profes-
sor Holbrook Working. See Hirshleifer, Speculation and Equilibrium, supra, at 519 (citing
Working’s argument that speculative hedging depends upon varying beliefs or knowledge re-
garding price prospects).
166. See Jeremy C. Stein, Informational Externalities and Welfare-reducing Speculation, 95
J. POL. ECON. 1123, 1125 (1987) (noting that papers on speculation tend “to ignore the issue of
heterogeneous information among market participants”). For examples of papers ignoring
subjective disagreement, see Hart & Kreps, supra note 141, at 928-29 (assuming that specula-
tors have access to the same information and therefore draw identical inferences); Leach, supra
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the normative implications of the model he proposed. His work nev-
ertheless suggests an alternative way of thinking about speculative
markets that differs strikingly from the risk hedging and information
arbitrage approaches.
2. Characteristics of HE Trading: Uncertainty, Speculator-with-
Speculator Trading and Ex Post Speculator Losses. Three important
characteristics of HE trading can help to develop the distinction be-
tween HE speculation on the one hand, and risk hedging and infor-
mation arbitrage on the other. The first is uncertainty as a prerequisite
to trade. Although even sophisticated commentators often blur the
distinction, “risk” and “uncertainty” are not synonyms. “Risk” de-
scribes circumstances where the future is unknown, but the probabil-
ity distribution of possible futures is known. A coin toss, for example,
is risky but not uncertain: although we do not know whether a tossed
coin will come up heads or tails, we know—and can agree—that there
is a 50% chance of either occurring.167 “Uncertainty,” in contrast, de-
scribes circumstances where the probabilities of possible future out-
comes are themselves imperfectly known.168 Thus the stock market is
both risky and uncertain: we not only do not know if the market will
rise or fall, we also do not know—and therefore can disagree on—the
probability of either event.169
                                                                                                                                     
note 141, at 132 (modeling speculation based on the assumption that all agents place an identi-
cal value on a given asset).
167. See Mark J. Machina & Michael Rothschild, Risk, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 201, 201 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter THE NEW
PALGRAVE] (“A situation is said to involve risk if the randomness facing an economic agent
can be expressed in terms of specific numerical probabilities . . . .”); see also Paul Davidson, Is
Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post Keynesian Perspective, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Winter 1991, at 129, 130-31 (discussing the “objective probability environment”).
168. See Peter J. Hammon, Uncertainty, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 167, at 728,
728, 732 (defining “uncertainty” as present whenever “a decision can lead to more than one
possible consequence” and discussing the term’s relation to subjective probabilities); see also
Davidson, supra note 167, at 131 (discussing the “subjective probability environment”).
169. The discussion below treats the terms “uncertainty” and “subjective disagreement” as
largely synonymous by emphasizing how people disagree in their probability estimates when
they have access to differing sets of private information. There is an alternative characteriza-
tion of “uncertainty,” often associated with the economist Frank Knight, which focuses on
situations when even a person with access to the common set of all available information might
find it impossible to make an estimate of future probabilities. See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 197-263 (1921); see also Davidson, supra note 167, at 131
(discussing the “true uncertainty environment,” in which the decisionmaker believes that un-
foreseeable changes will dictate future outcomes and that no reliable estimate of probabilities
can be made).
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Because uncertainty permits individuals to hold differing beliefs
concerning future probabilities,170 the notion of uncertainty as a pre-
requisite to trade provides a theoretical distinction between HE
trading and risk hedging. Although risk hedging obviously requires
risk, it does not require uncertainty: so long as two individuals’ tastes
for risk differ, they can arrange a hedging deal even if they share
identical expectations for the probability distribution of future prices.
In contrast, HE speculation requires two parties with differing sub-
jective estimates of future probabilities.171
While the requirement of uncertainty helps to distinguish HE
trading from risk hedging, at least at the theoretical level, the rela-
tionship between uncertainty and the information arbitrage approach
is more complex. In a sense, the information arbitrage model also
implies differences in traders’ subjective estimates of future prices.
Consider the case of the ignorant farmer who sells wheat at too low a
price to an information arbitrageur who accurately predicts an im-
pending shortage: presumably, the farmer would not sell cheaply if
she shared the arbitrageur’s estimate of future prices. At the same
time, the farmer does not so much disagree with the arbitrageur’s
predictions, as find it uneconomic invest in research.172 In effect, the
farmer grudgingly chooses to pay the price of ignorance because it
would be even more costly for her to do the research necessary to
avoid trading at a disadvantage.
Consequently, subjective disagreement alone may not suffice to
differentiate HE trading from information arbitrage. HE trading also
exhibits two additional characteristics that distinguish it from risk
hedging and information arbitrage, however. One is speculator-with-
speculator trading. Recall the risk hedging and information arbitrage
models’ predictions regarding the nature of speculators’ counterpar-
ties.173 According to the risk hedging model, speculators trade with
170. In contrast, in an objective probability environment, rational agents make identical
estimates of an asset’s statistical value. Thus, all rational individuals would place a statistical
value of 25 cents on an opportunity to flip a quarter “double or nothing.”
171. Uncertainty also provides a distinction between HE speculation and investment. In-
vestors perceive it as being in their interest to defer consumption by purchasing assets that pro-
vide a positive return even when they agree with the market’s valuation of those assets. Specula-
tors, in contrast, buy an asset when they disagree with its market price.
172. This observation explains why the information arbitrage model is consistent with ra-
tional expectations analysis, which predicts that rational individuals should never trade on
subjective disagreement. See infra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing the “no-trade”
result).
173. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
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hedgers who want to protect themselves from future price fluctua-
tions. According to the information arbitrage model, speculators deal
with rationally less well informed producers and consumers who de-
cline to invest in available, but costly, predictive information. Both
models thus imply that speculators deal with nonspeculators—traders
who are buying and selling for reasons other than the hope of profit-
ing from predicting a shift in market prices.
In contrast, HE transactions can involve speculators on both
sides. Thus, in the example presented earlier, bull and bear—both
speculators—disagreed in their predictions for the future price of
gold, and traded with one another. This analysis suggests that HE
trading can be identified by focusing on the nature of a speculator’s
counterparty. When a trader acquires superior predictive information
and trades profitably with rationally ignorant consumers or produc-
ers, the transaction involves information arbitrage. But, if the same
trader deals with a counterparty who also expects to reap trading
profits because she also believes she has superior predictive informa-
tion, the transaction is better described by the HE model.
Focusing on the identity of speculators’ counterparties helps to
explain a third fundamental characteristic of HE trading that distin-
guishes it from both risk hedging and information arbitrage: specula-
tor error as judged by ex post results. Consider again the case of the
bull who anticipates a $10 per ounce profit from buying gold and the
bear who hopes to avoid a $10 per ounce loss by selling. The bull and
bear cannot both be right. Although each hopes to reap an expected
gain of $10 per ounce from their trade ex ante ($20 per ounce total),
they necessarily experience an average return of $0: speculation on
disagreement is a zero-sum game in which one player’s gain is neces-
sarily the other’s loss.
Indeed, when HE trading involves transaction costs, speculators’
average returns become negative. Assume that to execute the trades
the bull and bear must each pay $1 per ounce brokers’ commissions.
While the traders expect total gains of $18 per ounce (each expects a
$9 net gain), the inevitable result of their trading is a $2 per ounce
decline in their aggregate wealth. This is because any gain enjoyed by
one party has come from the other’s pocket, and both have had to
pay brokers’ fees.174
174. See Stout, Casinos, supra note 132, at 670-77 (discussing the negative-sum nature of
stock speculation).
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The HE model of speculation consequently implies that HE
speculators as a class lose wealth as a result of trading.175 Some indi-
vidual traders may win while other lose, but the iron laws of mathe-
matics ensure that when transaction costs are positive, trading makes
HE speculators, on average, poorer. This result poses a stark contrast
to the risk hedging and information arbitrage theories, which both
predict that speculators as a class should reap trading profits at the
expense of their more risk-averse, less well informed counterpar-
ties.176 It also offers a means of testing the empirical—as opposed to
the theoretical—validity of the HE approach.
3. Empirical Evidence of HE Trading. If HE trading is common,
we should find evidence of both speculator-with-speculator trading
and ex post speculator losses in speculative markets. In fact, the
available data strongly suggest that in markets commonly associated
with speculation, such as the stock market and organized futures ex-
changes, both phenomena are present. The vast majority of trading in
the stock market, for example, appears driven by investors’ hopes to
beat the market.177 In other words, most investors who buy are ac-
quiring stocks they perceive as underpriced from others who sell be-
cause they think the same stocks are overpriced. This sort of specula-
tor-with-speculator trading is difficult to reconcile with the standard
risk hedging and information arbitrage theories. In contrast, the HE
model supports the idea of a trading market composed primarily, or
even entirely, of speculators hoping to outpredict each other.
Studies also have found that, both in the stock market and on the
organized futures exchanges, traders who identify themselves as
speculators on average lose money by trading.178 This remarkable re-
175. Ex post speculator error can be viewed as a consequence of imperfect information. See
infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing imperfect information as a cause of welfare-
reducing exchanges).
176. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
177. See Stout, Casinos, supra note 132, at 661-67 (reviewing evidence suggesting that the
vast majority of trading in the secondary stock market is driven by subjective disagreement). A
similar presumption underlies the hedging exception to the common law rule against difference
contracts, which reflects the judicial perception that most difference agreements are made be-
tween speculators, rather than between a speculator and a hedger. See supra notes 66-67 and
accompanying text.
178. See Stout, Casinos, supra note 132, at 663-64 (reviewing evidence that pension funds
and mutual funds that try to boost their returns by stock trading on average underperform the
market); Lester G. Telser, Why There Are Organized Futures Markets, 24 J.L. & ECON. 1, 9-10
(1981) (reviewing studies finding that speculators in futures markets on average incur losses).
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sult has been paid scant attention by theorists. It nevertheless pres-
ents a serious challenge to both the risk hedging model, which pre-
dicts that speculators should be paid a premium for bearing risk, and
the information arbitrage model, which predicts that arbitrageurs
should reap trading profits at their less well informed counterparties’
expense. The HE model, in contrast, both explains and predicts the
trading losses that speculators as a class experience.179
4. Some Objections to the HE Model: Rational Expectations and
Trader Learning. The heterogeneous expectations approach provides
an explanation for speculative trading that seems intuitively plausi-
ble. Moreover, the idea of HE trading is supported by empirical evi-
dence that seems impossible to reconcile with the risk hedging and
information arbitrage theories. Why, then, has the economic litera-
ture neglected the HE approach?
Contemporary theorists’ reluctance to incorporate expectations
heterogeneity into discussions of speculation may be due, in part, to
the fact that introducing subjective disagreement can enormously
compound the difficulties of mathematically describing rational deci-
sionmaking. In the face of disagreement, elegant and tidy market
models can become unruly. Theorists accordingly often prefer to
simply assume disagreement away. The standard Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model, for example, expressly assumes that all investors share
homogeneous expectations.180
At least two more substantive objections to the HE approach,
however, may have contributed to economists’ tendency to overlook
Hirshleifer’s papers on the subject of speculation. The first is associ-
ated with a branch of modern game theory known as “rational expec-
tations” analysis.181 Shortly after Hirshleifer published his work on
speculation, several prominent theorists responded with papers that
challenged the idea of disagreement-based trading as inconsistent
179. See infra text accompanying note 286 (discussing how CFTC inquiry into the identity
of speculating traders’ counterparties and into speculating traders’ ultimate success in their
quest for profits can help distinguish markets dominated by HE trading from markets where
most speculators are actually information arbitrageurs).
180. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text (discussing the standard Capital Asset
Pricing Model).
181. Rational expectations analysis was the basis for a recent Nobel Prize in economics. See
Great Expectations, and Rational Too, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 1995, at 96 (discussing the
work of economist Robert Lucas, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1995).
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with rational expectations.182 In the wake of this critique, the idea that
disagreeing speculators might trade with each other in mutual expec-
tation of profit largely disappeared from the theoretical literature.183
This disappearance may provide an instructive example of the
pitfalls associated with economists’ fascination with mathematical
models. The rational expectations critique of Hirshleifer’s HE model
relies on a result known as the “no-trade” theorem.184 In brief, the no-
trade theorem predicts that rational individuals should never trade on
subjective differences of opinion. This peculiar result is driven by the
idea that speculators who try to predict the future from limited in-
formation should realize that their estimates are imperfect, and re-
vise them in the face of another’s disagreement.185 Thus bulls should
refuse to buy when they learn that bears are willing to sell, and vice
versa. In effect, each party asks, “what does the other side know that
I don’t?”
At a general level, the proposition that traders pay attention to
others’ behavior seems quite plausible. Yet to reach its counterintui-
tive result, the no-trade theorem relies on several empirically un-
likely assumptions that counsel against dismissing the HE approach
on rational expectations grounds. These include the assumptions of
concordant beliefs (meaning that all speculators process information
in an identical fashion, and reach the same conclusion given the same
data) and common knowledge (meaning that all speculators know
that they share concordant beliefs, and all speculators know that all
speculators know this, and so on in infinite regress).186 In real mar-
182. See Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, 4 ANNALS STAT. 1236, 1236 (1976); John
D. Geanakoplos & Heraklis M. Polmarchakis, We Can’t Disagree Forever, 28 J. ECON.
THEORY 192, 192-93 (1982); Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade, and Common
Knowledge, 26 J. ECON. THEORY 17, 17 (1982); see also Jean Tirole, On the Possibility of
Speculation Under Rational Expectations, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1163, 1164 (1982) (concluding
that “contrary to the Working-Hirshleifer-Feiger view, rational and risk averse traders never
trade solely on the basis of differences in information”) (emphasis omitted).
183. For example, in a search of the LEXIS “LAWREV” database in February 1999, the
author was unable to find a single reference to Hirshleifer’s work on speculation.
184. See Milgrom & Stokey, supra note 182, at 17-18 (discussing the no-trade result).
185. See id. at 18.
186. For example, each of the sources cited supra at note 182 assume concordant beliefs
and common knowledge. Concordant beliefs and common knowledge do the work in ensuring
that bulls and bears refuse to trade: although the bull might initially believe that gold is likely
to rise, he also believes that the bear processes information just as he does, and would not be
willing to sell unless she had access to private negative information that would lead the bull
also to conclude gold was overpriced. The bull consequently revises his initial optimistic esti-
mate of gold downwards in light of the bear’s pessimism, while the bear similarly revises her
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kets, the assumptions of concordant beliefs and common knowledge
seem implausible.187 As a result, the rational expectations critique of
the HE model is something of a theoretical hothouse flower. Ra-
tional speculators certainly should extract information from others’
trading behavior and revise their initial expectations to some degree.
Their revisions are likely to be only partial, however, and disagree-
ment-based trading accordingly should persist.188
There is a second objection that can be raised against the notion
of a disagreement-based market, however, that also may have con-
tributed to the hegemony of the risk hedging and information arbi-
trage models. This second critique relies on the phenomenon of
trader learning. Over a series of repeated transactions, speculators
who trade on subjective disagreement should eventually realize that
the ex post result of their trading is trading losses, and should stop
trading. Thus, the argument goes, HE speculation should extinguish
itself over time.189
                                                                                                                                     
initial pessimistic estimate upwards in the light of the bull’s optimism. As a result, the bull and
the bear come to agree in their estimates, and no sale occurs.
187. For example, if speculators believe that some portion of traders in the market are
trading for reasons other than a disagreement with market price (e.g., because of changing risk
or consumption preferences), then common knowledge is lacking, and trading on disagreement
becomes rational. See HIRSHLEIFER, Two Models, supra note 165, at 294-95; Lynn A. Stout,
Agreeing to Disagree over Excessive Trading, 81 VA. L. REV. 751, 753-54 (1995). A similar out-
come ensues if, contrary to the assumption of concordant beliefs, rational people extract dif-
fering meanings from the same data. This is because the assumption of concordant beliefs relies
on the Bayesian premise that speculators estimating future events all start with identical prior
probability estimates, which they then revise in light of sample information. In reality, people
with different life experiences are likely to approach speculative markets with markedly differ-
ent priors, and therefore draw different conclusions from similar data. See Lynn A. Stout, Irra-
tional Expectations, 3 LEGAL THEORY 227, 240-41 (1997).
188. Indeed, any other suggestion appears flatly contradicted by the data. A second consid-
eration arguing against relying on the no-trade result is the overwhelming evidence that people
in fact often invest substantial resources on the basis of disagreement. (The present debate over
the consequences of speculation is, of course, itself a case in point.) If trading on disagreement
is inconsistent with rational expectations, this sort of behavior appears both endemic and pre-
dictable.
189. For example, commentators have cautioned that regulators should not draw inferences
from the spectacular losses recently reported by many investment funds and corporations that
use derivatives, because even if derivatives users may initially mistake the derivatives’ value,
over time the market should come to be dominated by traders who trade only when it truly
serves their interest to do so. See Thomas C. Theobald, Regulatory Chokehold: Derivatives
Aren’t the Danger, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1994, at A14 (arguing against derivatives regulation
on the theory that “[m]anagers who make informed decisions and have appropriate internal
controls in place . . . will emerge as winners in the marketplace. Those that don’t will be losers,
subject to the discipline of the market”).
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Considerable evidence suggests that traders who lose money
speculating do, in fact, eventually exit the markets.190 Nevertheless, at
least two important considerations suggest that speculative markets
can thrive in the face of trader learning. First, learning is more diffi-
cult in some markets than in others. For example, the natural volatil-
ity of stock prices makes it difficult for losing traders to determine
whether their losses are the result of poor prediction or mere
chance.191 Similarly, learning is likely to be slow in markets where
people trade only infrequently, like the residential real estate mar-
ket.192 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the learning critique of
the HE model confuses financial “survival of the fittest” with biologi-
cal survival. Even as one disappointed generation of HE speculators
leaves a market, demographic processes ensure that it will be re-
placed by a new generation eager to try its hand at trading. Darwin-
190. See Stout, Casinos, supra note 132, at 640 & n.74 (citing evidence that those who lose
money trading stocks stop trading); Telser, supra note 178, at 9-10 (reviewing studies finding
that larger speculators earn positive returns in futures markets and smaller traders suffer losses,
which implies that there may be more turnover among small speculators and that small specu-
lators who are successful become large while those who are unsuccessful leave the market and
are replaced by new small speculators); see also JAMES B. WOY, COMMODITIES FUTURES
TRADING: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE 5 (1976) (citing sources which suggest that “the drop-out
rate for beginning commodity speculators is very high”); Treasurers Put Their Views on Banks,
EUROMONEY, May 1995, at 65, 68 (positing that in wake of publicized cases of derivatives
losses, corporate treasurers have grown extremely cautious about using complex derivatives).
191. Two finance scholars once calculated that it would take twenty-five years for a fund
manager who outperformed the stock market by an impressive 2% each year to establish at a
95% confidence level that her superior performance was a result of skill rather than luck. See
Louis K.C. Chan & Josef Lakonishok, Are the Reports of Beta’s Death Premature?, J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT., Summer 1993, at 51, 54.
192. It also appears that experience gained in one financial instrument or strategy does not
necessarily carry over to others. For example, in 1987, many stock fund managers learned that
“portfolio insurance” strategies involving exchange-traded stock-index futures did not, in fact,
protect them against market declines. See George Anders, Investors Rush for Portfolio Insur-
ance, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1986, at A6 (describing the increasing popularity of the practice of
selling stock futures to hedge against losses in equities portfolio); George Anders, Portfolio
Insurance Failed to Serve as Cushion in Crash, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1987, at A6 (noting that
fund managers found portfolio insurance did not protect against losses in 1987 stock market
crash); Randall Smith, Use of Portfolio Insurance Fell After Crash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1988,
at A4 (reporting that the use of portfolio insurance shrank by two-thirds or more following the
1987 stock market crash). By the 1990s, however, managers again perceived opportunities to
eliminate equities risk through the similar strategy of “dynamic hedging” with “portfolio puts.”
See Kevin G. Salwen & Craig Torres, Portfolio Insurance Is Back for Stocks in New Guise,
WALL ST. J., May 31, 1990, at C1 (speculating that although traditional portfolio insurance used
prior to the 1987 stock market crash is “almost defunct,” institutions now attempt dynamic
hedging against stock market declines through portfolio puts).
STOUT TO PRINTER 04/15/99  4:22 PM
1999] WHY THE LAW HATES SPECULATORS 751
ian selection cannot reasonably be expected to eliminate HE trad-
ing.193
A closer examination of the trader learning argument accord-
ingly suggests that disagreement-based speculation can persist in a
variety of markets despite the likelihood that losing speculators will
stop trading eventually. At the same time, trader learning also im-
plies that HE trading may be more common in some markets, and
among some sorts of traders, than others. Part IV considers in greater
detail how this observation may offer insights to regulators seeking to
deter HE speculation in the market for OTC derivatives.194
B. Normative Implications of the HE Model
Thus far, the analysis has focused on developing the HE model
of speculation as a theoretical alternative to conventional theories, as
well as considering some of its positive insights into speculative mar-
kets. The HE approach also carries vital normative implications,
however. This is because the HE model contradicts the risk hedging
model’s prediction that speculation benefits the trading parties, by
suggesting how speculation can reduce average trader welfare. Fur-
ther, it undermines the information arbitrage model’s prediction that
speculation improves price accuracy, and in fact explains how specu-
lation may reduce it. In other words, the HE model suggests that
speculative trading—whether in stocks, real estate, or derivatives—
can be economically inefficient.
1. HE Trading and Trader Welfare. Neoclassical economic the-
ory generally assumes that voluntary exchange benefits both sides to
a transaction.195 The risk hedging model of speculation fits neatly into
this view by predicting that risk hedging, on average, benefits both
hedgers and their speculating counterparties. Hedgers are happy to
pay to avoid risk, while less risk-averse speculators are happy to be
paid a premium to bear it. In contrast, the HE model paints a darker
193. See Stout, Casinos, supra note 132, at 637-41 (explaining why investor learning should
not be expected to eliminate speculative trading).
194. See, e.g., infra notes 295-302 and accompanying text.
195. Neoclassical theory also recognizes, however, that in the face of incomplete and het-
erogeneous information, rational parties may expect benefits from exchange ex ante that fail to
materialize ex post. Consider, for example, the case of the consumer who buys tainted milk.
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picture of speculation’s effects by suggesting how speculative trading
may inefficiently reduce trader welfare.196
The HE model predicts that trading driven by subjective disa-
greement can have the perverse effect of harming trader welfare
through two distinct mechanisms: first, by reducing traders’ wealth
through trading that produces a net negative return; and second, by
increasing traders’ exposure to risk.197 Focusing first on the issue of
HE traders’ returns from trading, recall that when transaction costs
are positive, disagreement-based trading inevitably reduces partici-
pants’ aggregate monetary wealth.198 Some individual traders may win
while other lose, but transaction costs ensure that traders as a class
lose money by trading. Of course, risk hedging deals also involve
transaction costs that reduce trader wealth. The parties to a risk
hedging transaction, however, generally enjoy ex post the risk-
shifting benefits they anticipated and were willing to pay for ex ante.
As a result, risk hedging reallocates resources in a fashion that in-
creases their value as measured by individuals’ willingness to pay for
them. In contrast, HE speculators hope to become richer by trading
on their contrary predictions, yet find themselves, on average, poorer.
This curious result produces the prediction that heterogeneous ex-
pectations trading decreases the ex post monetary wealth—and wel-
fare—of speculating traders.
Second, and more subtly, disagreement-based trading also car-
ries the potential to reduce trader welfare by increasing risk, because
the perceived opportunity to profit from predicting future prices can
tempt HE speculators into volatile markets that they would other-
wise avoid, just as it tempts them into paying transaction costs that
they would otherwise avoid.199 Consider the example of the speculator
196. As in the case of the purchase of tainted milk, this ex post speculator error can be de-
scribed as a consequence of imperfect information. Given perfect information regarding the
future, bull and bear both would know whether gold prices were going to rise or fall. No trade
would occur because if one were willing to buy the other would be unwilling to sell, and vice
versa. However, since imperfect information permits subjective disagreement, bull and bear
each perceive opportunities to extract trading profits from the other despite the zero-sum na-
ture of such transactions.
197. Modern portfolio theory predicts that rational traders should care about only two vari-
ables when choosing a trading strategy: the likely returns from the strategy, and the likely risk
of those returns. See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 7, at 173-83 (describing the birth
of portfolio theory and the relationship between risk and return). Since returns are good and
risk is bad, traders accordingly try to maximize returns while minimizing risk.
198. See supra text accompanying note 174.
199. See Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of
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whose wealth is already concentrated in gold. Portfolio theory cau-
tions the speculator to reduce the risk of his portfolio by diversifying,
selling gold to buy other investments such as stocks or diamonds.200 If
the speculator expects gold prices to soon rise, however, he may buy
more gold, increasing the risk of his portfolio.201 Similarly, corporate
executives, municipal treasurers, and investment fund managers who
believe that they can predict future interest rates or market prices
may choose to negotiate derivatives deals that increase their institu-
tions’ risk exposure, believing that they will reap trading profits that
compensate for the increased risk.202 Unfortunately, when speculators
are really HE traders, this belief is statistically mistaken.
Trading on subjective disagreement can accordingly reduce
trader welfare by tempting otherwise risk-averse traders into accept-
ing uncompensated risks. While these welfare losses may be more
difficult to quantify than wealth losses due to HE trading, they are
just as real. In illustration, Part IV returns to consider in greater de-
tail the case of speculative trading in OTC derivatives.
2. HE Trading, Price Accuracy, and Speculative Bubbles. By ex-
plaining how disagreement-based speculation can reduce traders’
monetary wealth while increasing their risk, the HE model offers a
striking counterpoint to the risk hedging model’s prediction that
speculation improves trader welfare. Mutually beneficial risk shifting
is not the only efficiency benefit economists associate with specula-
tion, however. According to the information arbitrage model, specu-
lation also serves allocative efficiency by promoting “informational”
or “pricing” efficiency—i.e., by improving the accuracy of market
prices.
                                                                                                                                     
Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and Erode Returns In Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53, 62-
63 (1995) (arguing that the HE model suggests that opportunities for derivatives speculation
can increase the average trader’s assumed risks and reduce his returns by increasing transaction
costs).
200. Because the prices of the other investments are likely to vary in different patterns
from gold prices (e.g., stock prices rise when gold prices fall), diversifying an asset portfolio can
reduce its overall risk or variation. See generally BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 153-65
(discussing how diversification reduces risk).
201. This point should not be overstated. Sometimes subjective disagreement with market
prices can lead a trader to reduce risk, as when a gold bull becomes bearish, and sells. As a
general matter, however, HE speculation seems likely to increase traders’ risk by tempting
them into volatile markets they otherwise would avoid.
202. See infra notes 271-73 and accompanying text (discussing recent examples in which
derivatives speculation increased an institution’s risk exposure, in some cases leading to bank-
ruptcy or near-bankruptcy).
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In a market where speculators are truly information arbitrageurs
armed with superior knowledge about the future, speculation should
indeed shift prices to more accurately reflect the underlying forces of
supply and demand.203 The HE model of trading suggests, however,
that traders who believe they have superior information can be mis-
taken in their belief. Their information is not superior to the informa-
tion of other traders; it is merely different. This possibility challenges
the conventional presumption that speculators improve the accuracy
of market prices.
The HE model undermines the claim that speculators improve
market prices because under the HE model, speculators who trade on
subjective disagreement with market prices are just as likely to be
wrong as right.204 Thus there is no reason to believe a priori that a
market price influenced by HE traders’ bullish and bearish opinions
will be any more accurate than the price set in a market composed
only of actual producers and consumers.205 Unlike true information
arbitrage, HE speculation does not produce a social benefit in the
form of better pricing.
In lawmakers’ eyes, however, speculators traditionally have been
perceived as guilty of more than just failing to improve market prices.
To the contrary, speculators have often been accused of triggering
speculative price “bubbles”—instances where market prices rise sud-
denly, inexplicably, and unreasonably before the bubble bursts and
prices return to earlier levels. The most famous example may be the
1637 Dutch tulip bulb frenzy. During the course of this “tulipmania,”
the price of common tulip bulbs rose twenty-fold before abruptly
sinking again to previous levels.206
203. This is not to say that prices in a market deprived of information arbitrageurs would be
completely divorced from economic reality; presumably, consumers and producers also invest
some effort in valuing the goods and services they trade. Recognizing that consumers and pro-
ducers do not necessarily need information arbitrageurs to value assets helps explain why the
private costs of information arbitrage can outweigh its public benefits. See supra note 154 and
accompanying text (discussing the possible inefficiency of information arbitrage).
204. After all, when a bull predicts that prices will rise while a bear predicts a fall, at least
one must be mistaken.
205. Cf. Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transactions Costs, and Investor Welfare: Is a Motley
Fool Born Every Minute?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791, 801-02 n.24 (1997) [hereinafter Stout, Tech-
nology] (criticizing the argument that adding speculators to the market increases the accuracy
of prices by increasing the size of the sample from which average opinion is drawn).
206. See Peter M. Garber, Tulipmania, 97 J. POL. ECON. 535, 556 (1989).
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Scholars who study markets have shown an enduring fascination
with bubbles.207 Because most find the idea of bubbles difficult to rec-
oncile with conventional pricing theory, some have questioned
whether bubbles really occur, arguing that reported bubbles in the
markets for art, real estate, and so forth actually reflect the impact on
prices of important new information—information that academics,
presumably, are unable to detect.208 Others have suggested that bub-
bles prove that some traders are irrational.209 Yet a third approach is
reflected in the growing literature that explains price bubbles as self-
fulfilling prophecies, the rational by-products of expectations that
prices will soon deviate from fundamental values.210 These “rational
bubble” theories have been criticized, however, for failing to explain
how deviations from fundamental value initially arise.211
207. See generally id. at 536 n.2 (discussing historical examples of speculation that econo-
mists have classified as bubbles); BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL
STREET 34-53 (6th ed. 1996) (same).
208. See, e.g., Robert P. Flood & Robert J. Hodrick, On Testing for Speculative Bubbles, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 85, 87 (contending that bubble findings can be explained as re-
sults of model misspecification or market fundamentals).
209. See, e.g., David M. Cutler et al., Speculative Dynamics and the Role of Feedback Trad-
ers, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 63, 65 (1990) (discussing irrational “feedback” traders); J. Bradford
De Long et al., Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation,
45 J. FIN. 379, 393-94 (1990) (attributing bubbles to irrational “noise” traders).
210. See Robert P. Flood & Peter M. Garber, Bubbles, Runs, and Gold Monetization, in
CRISES IN THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 275, 276 (Paul Wachtel ed., 1982)
[hereinafter CRISES] (defining a price bubble as when “the arbitrary self-fulfilling expectation
of price changes may drive actual price changes independently of market fundamentals”); see
also Costas Azariadis, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 380, 388-90 (1981)
(showing that self-fulfilling prophecies occur frequently due to “extraneous uncertainty”); Ol-
iver J. Blanchard & Mark W. Watson, Bubbles, Rational Expectations, and Financial Markets,
in CRISES, supra, at 295, 296-301 (explaining how bubbles proceed independently of an asset’s
fundamental value); Behzad T. Diba & Herschel I. Grossman, Rational Inflationary Bubbles,
21 J. MONETARY ECON. 35, 38 (1988) (demonstrating the self-confirming nature of rational
bubbles).
211. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Froot et al., Herd On The Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a
Market with Short-Term Speculation, 47 J. FIN. 1461, 1479 (1992) (arguing that the “rational
bubble” model “offers no mechanism for what drives the market away from efficiency”);
Leach, supra note 141, at 132 (questioning how the model would explain what initiates bub-
bles); see also M.C. Adam & A. Szafarz, Speculative Bubbles and Financial Markets, 44
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 626, 637-38 (1992) (concluding that rational expectations bubble theo-
ries do not fit the traditional conceptions of bubbles). The HE approach complements rational
bubble theory by explaining why rational speculators might expect market prices to deviate
from fundamental values. In particular, the HE approach suggests that in an incomplete mar-
ket, an increase in uncertainty can produce price shifts that appear unjustified to the average
observer. See infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text (discussing HE bubbles).
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One reason why bubbles have presented such a problem for
theorists is that most analyses rely, implicitly or explicitly, on asset
pricing models that assume homogeneous expectations.212 Such mod-
els generally predict that market prices reflect the best possible esti-
mates of assets’ fundamental values.213 Although closer inspection re-
veals that this result is nearly a tautology (if all traders share identical
expectations for a particular asset’s future risks and returns, why
wouldn’t the market price mirror that consensus?) it nevertheless
makes bubbles seem difficult to explain.
Yet while pricing models that assume homogenous expectations
remain a staple of introductory finance texts,214 a large and growing
literature has begun to address how asset prices are set under condi-
tions of expectations heterogeneity.215 These HE pricing models can
explain a variety of otherwise puzzling market behaviors, including
speculative bubbles.216 In illustration, the discussion below presents a
simple example of a bubble in a market where individuals have het-
erogeneous expectations. Although this example does not offer an
definitive explanation for all bubbles217—a full discussion of the na-
212. The classic example is the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). See
BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 180-90 (describing CAPM, which predicts a linear rela-
tionship between return and risk).
213. See, e.g., id. at 337 (relying on homogeneity-based model for the proposition that one
should always trust prices in an efficient market). But see Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets
Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 480-81 (1997) [hereinafter Stout, CAPM and ECMH] (arguing that
while CAPM remains useful for describing a rational investor’s attitude toward risk versus re-
turn, the model should not be relied upon as evidence that market price necessarily reflects an
investment’s intrinsic value).
214. See, e.g., BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 180-90 (presenting CAPM).
215. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 104-13
(1970); John Lintner, The Aggregation of Investor’s [sic] Diverse Judgments and Preferences in
Purely Competitive Securities Markets, 4 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 347 (1969); Edward M.
Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151 (1977); Lynn A. Stout,
Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99
YALE L.J. 1235 (1990) [hereinafter Stout, Takeover Premiums]; Hal R. Varian, Divergence of
Opinion in Complete Markets: A Note, 40 J. FIN. 309 (1985); Joseph T. Williams, Capital Asset
Prices with Heterogeneous Beliefs, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 219 (1977). This body of work addressing the
problem of equilibrium asset pricing under conditions of heterogeneity presents an interesting
contrast to academic discussions of speculation, which tend to ignore disagreement’s role in
inspiring trading.
216. See Stout, CAPM and ECMH, supra note 213, at 479 (discussing how heterogeneous
expectations models can explain a variety of market anomalies).
217. Because the example assumes obstacles to short selling, it may not provide a good de-
scription of price bubbles in assets with well-developed futures or options markets. However,
the example may shed light on a variety of reported instances of speculative bubbles in spot
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ture and causes of asset price distortions under conditions of subjec-
tive disagreement lies beyond the scope of this Article—it illustrates
how HE theory supports the traditional association between specula-
tors and price distortions.218
The example begins with the assumption that there are obstacles
to short selling (i.e., selling borrowed assets).219 As discussed in Part I,
federal securities law imposes significant restrictions on speculators
who want to sell short in the stock market.220 Although bearish
speculators who deal in other assets do not face this legal hurdle,
practical difficulties severely limit short selling in most spot markets.
For example, a bull who wants to “go long” in real estate or fine art
must arrange only two transactions: a purchase, and a sale. In con-
trast, a bear who wants to short property she doesn’t already own
must arrange four transactions: a loan, a sale, a purchase, and then a
return of the borrowed asset. Short sellers’ transaction costs are cor-
respondingly higher,221 especially because there are few organized
                                                                                                                                     
markets, such as the tulip frenzy. Moreover, finance scholars have begun to use the HE ap-
proach to develop bubble models that do not depend on short sales restrictions. See, e.g., Jack
Treynor, Bulls, Bears, and Market Bubbles, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 69, 71
(examining bubbles in a complex model that relies on wealth effects).
218. In addition to their supposed role in unintentionally sparking price bubbles, specula-
tors are often accused of deliberately manipulating market prices through such schemes such as
“corners” and “squeezes.” See generally Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodities
Futures Prices—The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (1991) [hereinafter Mark-
ham, Manipulation] (discussing commodities manipulation); Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipula-
tion of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1987) (same);
Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Mar-
kets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991) (discussing manipulation of securities and commodities
markets); Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 219 (1994) (discussing manipulation in securities trading).
219. HE pricing models generally must employ one of a number of reasonable assumptions
of market incompleteness (e.g., risk aversion, wealth limitations, or short sales restrictions).
The need for such assumptions becomes apparent if we return to the gold-trading example and
assume that the bull who perceives an opportunity to reap certain profits of $10 per ounce by
buying “underpriced” gold is willing to commit all his wealth and an infinite amount of bor-
rowed wealth as well to that purpose. If the bear similarly is willing to sell an infinite amount,
trader disagreement prevents equilibrium. Bull and bear will, in effect, take infinite bets against
each other. Incomplete markets, in contrast, limit traders’ willingness or ability to take infinite
positions, and thus permit equilibrium prices to exist in the face of disagreement. However,
prices under such conditions may not necessarily equal the best estimate of value given all
available data. See generally authorities cited supra notes 215 and 217 (discussing asset pricing
under heterogeneous expectations).
220. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
221. Any attempt to circumvent such costs by entering an off-exchange agreement for
payments contingent on price changes runs afoul of the rule against difference contracts and its
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borrowing markets outside the securities markets.222 These and other
difficulties ensure that short selling is generally difficult and expen-
sive.223
The net result is a selection bias that may offer an elegant and in-
tuitive explanation for many speculative bubbles, because it implies
that adding disagreeing HE speculators to an asset market previously
comprised only of producers and consumers can inflate market
prices. To see how this works, consider a simple three-period exam-
ple in which the arrival and subsequent resolution of uncertainty in-
duces speculators first to enter, and then to depart, the gold market.224
Assume that in the first period, all individuals share homogeneous
expectations for the future price of gold—all expect gold to continue
to trade at its current market price of $500 per ounce, as determined
by preferences and production costs. As result there is no disagree-
ment and no speculation. The only individuals who purchase gold are
those who extract consumption value from it or plan to use it as a
productive input (e.g., jewelers and dentists).
In period two, new information arrives that creates uncertainty
about future gold prices—perhaps the market receives news of a mili-
tary coup in some gold-producing nation. Assume that the new in-
formation changes the expectations of only two individuals in the
market. One predicts gold production will fall, and prices will rise
from $500 to $510 per ounce in the next period; the second predicts
an increase in production, so that price will fall to $490. The expecta-
                                                                                                                                     
modern descendant, the Commodity Exchange Act. See supra Part I.A and notes 88-91 and
accompanying text (describing the common law and modern statutory prohibitions).
222. In contrast to speculators who go long (who can usually take advantage of preexisting
spot markets developed to serve producers and consumers), speculators seeking to borrow as-
sets to sell short may have to incur substantial search and negotiation costs to arrange a loan.
223. The relative thinness of the asset borrowing market also increases the risk that a short
seller will fall victim to a “short squeeze” or similar manipulative scheme. For example, the
1992 Salomon Brothers Treasury Note trading scandal was allegedly part of a scheme to
squeeze dealers who had shorted Treasury Note futures. See MARTIN MAYER, NIGHTMARE ON
WALL STREET: SALOMON BROTHERS AND THE CORRUPTION OF THE MARKETPLACE 191-197
(1993); see also Richard T. Baillie et al., Bear Squeezes, Volatility Spillovers and Speculative
Attacks in the Hyperinflation 1920s Foreign Exchange, 12 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 511, 512
(1993) (describing the practice of a “bear squeeze”).
224. The example will incorporate a number of strong assumptions, including the assump-
tions of no short selling, first and final periods of absolute certainty and homogeneous expecta-
tions, uncertainty that increases the dispersion of traders’ expectations but does not change av-
erage expectations, and an asset supply sufficiently limited so that a speculator can “corner the
market” and determine prices. These assumptions are adopted for ease of illustration only.
Similar results are produced even if these assumptions are relaxed, although the analysis be-
comes more complicated.
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tions of all others in the market remain unchanged. The ambiguous
new information consequently has increased the dispersion of expec-
tations in the market without changing the average expectation,
which remains $500 per ounce.
The arrival of uncertainty and subjective disagreement in period
two means that there now exists a bull who expects gold prices to
rise, and a bear who predicts prices will fall. Both perceive opportuni-
ties to reap speculative profits by trading on their differing predic-
tions. If short sales are restricted, however, bull and bear face asym-
metrical trading opportunities. While the bull can easily go long and
acquire gold, the bear’s options are much more limited; unless she al-
ready holds gold, she cannot sell on her prediction of a price decline.
Thus, the only speculator who enters the market will be the bull who
expects prices to rise.225
The entry of an optimistic speculator into a market previously
composed only of consumers and producers puts upward pressure on
prices even if the average price expectation remains unchanged. This
is because the available supply of gold will move into the hands of the
bull, whose reservation price for gold is $510 per ounce. So long as he
believes his own forecast, he will not willingly part with gold for less.
Thus, gold prices rise in period two in a bubble that appears—to the
average individual—to be an unjustified response to the ambiguous
news of the coup.
Selection bias may explain the initial appearance of a speculative
bubble, but why does the bubble burst? Just as the arrival of uncer-
tainty and disagreement can precipitate a bubble, the resolution of
uncertainty can cause the bubble to disappear. Assume that after the
price rise observed in period two, the market receives new informa-
tion in the third period that resolves much of the uncertainty created
by the coup—perhaps time has passed, and the new regime has be-
come more settled and predictable. Assume also, for simplicity’s
sake, that the traders’ original responses to uncertainty prove to have
been unbiased, so that the elimination of disagreement does not
change the average expectation, which remains $500 per ounce. Bull
and bear both learn they were mistaken to expect a change in gold
225. A similar selection bias is responsible for the “winner’s curse” that has been repeat-
edly observed in auctions, where the procedure of selling to the highest bidder tends to produce
an auction price exceeding the average bidder’s estimate of value. See generally RICHARD H.
THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50-62
(1992) (describing the winner’s curse and considering whether it is consistent with rational ex-
pectations).
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production, and revise their expectations to agree with the average
expectation. Period three, like period one, is characterized by cer-
tainty and subjective agreement. All individuals, including the former
bull, now expect gold to trade at $500 per ounce. The price of gold
accordingly declines.
This simple bubble example offers a host of useful lessons. First,
it implies that bubbles can be a predictable consequence of increased
uncertainty that invites a self-selected group of optimistic speculators
into an asset market where short selling is restricted. In other words, a
price bubble—a price rise that appears unjustified in average opin-
ion—can be produced simply by increasing the dispersion of subjec-
tive expectations for future prices.226 The bubble is driven by the se-
lection bias inherent in a market price set by the optimistic tail of a
distribution that is “stretched” when increased uncertainty increases
the dispersion of expectations. Indeed, even news that lowers the av-
erage individual’s expectations might spark a bubble if it greatly in-
creased the dispersion of expectations. This analysis suggests that any
development that increases the dispersion of expectations can pre-
cipitate a bubble.227 For example, a shift in previously stable con-
sumer preferences might trigger a bubble by creating uncertainty
about future preferences. This may explain the Dutch tulipmania,
which appears to have been an overreaction to the appearance of a
fashion fad among French ladies who took to wearing tulips in their
gowns.228
The example also suggests an explanation of how speculation on
disagreement may not only fail to improve the accuracy of market
prices, but sometimes may actually distort them. When short sales are
226. Similarly, new information that increases certainty compacts the distribution and
brings prices back to their earlier range.
227. The HE model thus generates testable predictions concerning the circumstances likely
to favor bubbles. In particular, it predicts that bubbles can be a natural consequence of exoge-
nous technological or economic developments that increase expectations heterogeneity, invit-
ing speculators into markets originally composed primarily of consumers and producers. In
other words, bubbles are triggered by uncertainty—increased dispersion of subjective probabil-
ity estimates—rather than mere risk. Even if the price of a particular good or service has been
historically volatile, bubbles are unlikely when traders share similar expectations for the prob-
ability distribution of future prices. Thus bubbles should occur less frequently in markets for
agricultural products such as wheat or corn, where prices vary considerably according to
weather patterns but where traders have access to extensive common information regarding
price volatility. On the other hand, risky prices can contribute to the incidence of speculation in
a particular market by slowing the learning process that eventually drives unsuccessful specula-
tors from the market. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
228. See Garber, supra note 206, at 543 & n.22.
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restricted, adding a self-selected group of optimistic speculators to a
market previously composed of consumers and producers can raise
the market price, even when the average of all individuals’ estimates
of value remains unchanged. Yet if individuals’ estimation errors
tend to be unbiased, the average of their expectations is more likely
to be an accurate measure of value than any individual expectation.229
Thus, speculation that raises market price above the average expecta-
tion seems likely to decrease the accuracy of prices, with a corre-
sponding decrease in allocative efficiency.230
The argument that speculators can distort market prices is sub-
ject to an important caveat, however. It should be noted that the type
of bubble examined above relies on two preconditions: subjective
disagreement, and short sales restrictions. As a result, a bubble can
be said to be caused as much by the incomplete nature of a market
where short selling is restricted, as by the phenomenon of speculation
itself. This suggests that when it is difficult or impossible to discour-
age bullish HE speculators from entering a market, a second-best
means of preventing bubbles might be to open the door to bears as
well, by helping them avoid the costs associated with shorting in the
spot market. In other words, some types of price bubbles can be best
avoided not by discouraging speculation, but by encouraging short
sales. The 1637 tulip bubble, for example, burst shortly after Dutch
traders developed an options market that made shorting tulip bulbs
much easier.231
229. As a result, HE pricing models can explain a variety of pricing “anomalies” that have
been observed in highly-speculative markets. For example, HE pricing models have been of-
fered in explanation of the “small-firm effect” and the “neglected-firm effect” in stock markets,
as well as instances of negative risk premia contrary to the dictates of the CAPM. See Stout,
Takeover Premiums, supra note 215, at 1257 & n.112; see also Miller, supra note 215, at 1155
(discussing how differences in opinion may explain puzzling stock market behavior).
230. This analysis relies upon a presumption that short sales restrictions are less important
in markets composed entirely of individuals who actually produce or consume an asset, because
someone who becomes bearish in such a market is much more likely at any point to actually
own the asset she wants to sell. As a result, bears often don’t need to borrow the assets they
want to “short”—instead they can simply sell what they already own. Prices set in a market
composed entirely of producers and consumer consequently are more likely to approximate the
average of all expectations than are prices set in a market dominated by an optimistic subset of
speculators.
231. See Garber, supra note 206, at 543. A rising demand for tulips due to French fashion
appears to have driven the tulipmania by inviting a general class of speculators into the Dutch
tulip bulb market, which was previously limited to professional growers. See id. & n.22. During
the height of the Dutch tulip frenzy, the absence of a well-developed borrowing market may
have made it difficult for pessimists to sell short on their bearish opinions. See id. at 544. Opti-
mistic speculators who expected tulip prices to rise still further, however, could and did go long.
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The HE model consequently implies that under some circum-
stances, opening the door to bearish speculators through futures and
options trading can improve the accuracy of market prices through a
mechanism quite different than that described by the information ar-
bitrage model. At the same time, the heterogeneous expectations ap-
proach also suggests that, under other circumstances, opening futures
and options markets can decrease price accuracy even as it reduces
obstacles to short selling. Futures and options trading decreases the
marginal cost of speculation. As a result, allowing futures and options
trading may draw a larger number of individuals into a particular
market, increasing the range of traders’ opinions. Once composed of
optimists and pessimists, the larger market now includes the wildly
optimistic and wildly pessimistic as well. If any differential persists
between the costs of going long and the costs of selling short, such an
increase in the dispersion of opinions may increase, rather than de-
crease, the likelihood of bubbles.232 The net result is that asset pricing
models that recognize that traders have heterogeneous expectations
offer a much more uncertain view of whether speculative trading
generally, or speculative trading through futures and options in par-
ticular, is likely to increase or decrease the accuracy of market prices.
Part IV returns to consider in greater detail some of the implications
of this result for the regulation of speculative trading in OTC deriva-
tives.
C. Summary: The HE Model and the Common Law Conception of
Speculation
It should now be apparent that an analysis of speculation that in-
corporates the reality of expectations heterogeneity offers a way of
thinking about speculative markets that is more complex, but also
                                                                                                                                     
See id. at 543-45. Thus, in accord with HE theory, tulip bulb prices rose in an exaggerated and
unjustified bubble. See id. Also in accord with HE theory, the development of a bulb futures
market, which might have increased opportunities for short selling, may have contributed to the
bursting of the tulip bubble. See id. Thus formal futures markets for bulbs were developed in
the summer of 1636 and became “the primary focus of trading before the [price] collapse in
February 1637.” Id. at 543.
232. In any case, because futures and options decrease the marginal cost of speculation for
bulls as well as bears, allowing such trading seems likely to increase both the number of HE
traders in the market and the frequency of their trading, possibly producing an increase in trad-
ers’ welfare losses that outweighs any resulting price accuracy benefit. See generally Stout,
Technology, supra note 205, at 808-10 (discussing how the reduction of transaction costs can
increase welfare losses from speculation when the demand for speculative trading is highly elas-
tic).
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more realistic, than the simple “speculation is efficient” claim associ-
ated with conventional theory. This more nuanced perspective warns
both against assuming that speculation increases traders’ net welfare,
as predicted by the risk hedging model, and against the idea that
speculation promotes correct pricing, as suggested by the information
arbitrage model. To the contrary, disagreement-based speculation
may reduce traders’ net welfare and decrease the accuracy of market
prices. These results present a striking challenge to the standard view
that speculation furthers efficiency. They also provide a solid theo-
retical foundation for the legal hostility towards speculators de-
scribed in Part I.233
Consider first lawmakers’ traditional belief that speculation is
“nonproductive.” As noted earlier, this notion conflicts with both the
risk hedging model and the information arbitrage approach, as both
predict that speculation serves allocative efficiency. By predicting
that trading on disagreement can reduce average trader welfare and
distort prices, however, the heterogeneous expectations approach
supports the view that speculation is a nonproductive—indeed poten-
tially destructive—activity.
Similarly, the HE model also may explain the charge that
speculation contributes to poverty among speculators. This charge
can be recharacterized as a claim that speculation increases the level
of risk found in the market. Although such a suggestion contradicts
the risk hedging model’s prediction that speculation reduces aggre-
gate risk, the HE model supports the idea that speculation can tempt
even risk-averse individuals into riding the markets’ changing tides,
creating both more millionaires and more paupers.
Finally, the HE approach provides theoretical support for the
third form of economic harm traditionally associated with specula-
tion—price bubbles. Asset pricing models that recognize the reality
of subjective disagreement offer the unsettling prediction that
speculative trading can sometimes improve, and sometimes harm, the
accuracy of market prices. Although this indeterminate result may be
intellectually unsatisfying, it supports the idea of a link between
speculators and bubbles, by explaining how price increases can be
triggered by optimistic speculators’ entry into markets previously
dominated by producers and consumers.234
233. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
234. See Adam & Szafarz, supra note 211, at 637-38 (concluding that rational expectations
bubble theories do not fit the traditional conception of bubbles).
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In sum, the HE model of speculation suggests that common
sense and the common law may be far more solidly grounded in the
economic realities of the market than conventional economic theory
would appear to suggest. That possibility raises questions about the
wisdom of the modern trend of discounting the value of legal barriers
to speculation and even, in some cases, removing them. In illustra-
tion, the next Part considers lawmakers’ response to the growth of
the market for derivatives.
IV. HE SPECULATION AND THE MARKET FOR OTC DERIVATIVES
Commentators sometimes use the word “derivative” to de-
scribe any contract whose value depends on (is derived from) the
spot market price of an underlying good or service.235 Because this
broad definition encompasses both forward contracts for the sale of
goods to be delivered in the future, and exchange-traded futures and
options, derivatives of agricultural and industrial commodities such
as grain and copper have in fact been traded for centuries.236 In recent
years, however, there has been an explosion in trading of contracts
whose values are based on financial instruments such as currencies,
corporate stocks, stock indexes, and debt obligations. Some of these
“financial derivatives” take the form of standardized futures and op-
tions listed for trading on a regulated exchange.237 The much larger
market, however, is the market for individually and privately negoti-
ated over-the-counter (OTC) transactions.238
The sudden appearance of a thriving OTC market in financial
derivatives raises a host of policy problems for regulators. For exam-
ple, the Internal Revenue Service has been called upon to clarify de-
235. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 7, at 1464-65 (explaining that a
“defining characteristic” of derivatives is that their value depends on changes in the price of an
underlying asset).
236. See supra note 231 (describing options markets for tulip bulbs in 1637).
237. The second most frequently traded contract on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, for
example, is a futures contract based on the stocks comprising the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index.
See FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, supra note 91, at 8.
238. For example, two of the largest derivatives markets are the off-exchange “interbank”
market for foreign currency futures and options and the OTC market for “swaps.” See Tormey,
supra note 9, at 2357-58 (describing the global interbank currency market); infra notes 243-44
and accompanying text (describing the swap market); see also Jerry W. Markham, Confederate
Bonds, supra note 161, at 3 (noting that in 1991, the OTC swaps market alone was as large as
the regulated exchange market).
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rivatives’ tax treatment;239 the SEC has adopted rules outlining corpo-
rations’ obligations to disclose their derivatives use to investors;240
and the Federal Reserve has been forced to revise the capital re-
quirements it imposes on banks and other financial institutions.241 In
addition to these regulatory issues, however—and perhaps more sig-
nificantly in terms of derivatives’ ultimate effect on the economy—
OTC derivatives raise serious questions about the continued efficacy
of American antispeculation laws.
A. OTC Derivatives as Off-Exchange Futures and Options
Derivative agreements generally create either an obligation, or
an option, to make or receive payments determined by the future
price of some underlying currency, debt obligation, stock, or stock
index.242 As this description implies, derivatives are futures and op-
tions that are not generally settled by actually delivering the under-
lying financial instrument. Instead, they are settled through a cash
payment or series of cash payments determined by changes in the
market price of the underlying instrument.
Consider one of the most common derivative forms, the interest
rate “swap.”243 In a typical swap, Firm A exchanges its promise to pay
a fixed rate of interest—say, 7% annually on a $100,000 underlying
“notional” amount—for firm B’s promise to pay a floating interest
rate on an equivalent notional amount. To accomplish the same re-
sult in the spot market for corporate debt, Firm A would have to is-
sue a $100,000 bond at 7% interest, and then buy another firm’s
$100,000 floating-rate bond. In the swap market, however, A and B
can avoid actually transferring the underlying $100,000 by simply
239. See IRS Introduces Derivatives Pricing Model, but Many Issues Remain Under Discus-
sion, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 481, 492 (Apr. 11, 1997).
240. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.4-08, 229.305, 230.419, 240.17a-12 (1996).
241. See Fed Adopts Final Revisions to Capital Requirements for Derivatives Holdings, 27
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1417, 1422 (Sept. 1, 1995).
242. See Hazen, supra note 7, at 989 (observing that derivatives are essentially futures and
options); Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 7, at 1466-67 & n.40 (same).
243. See Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vul-
nerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 346-53 (1989) (describing interest
rate swaps); Jerry W. Markham, Hybrid Instruments, supra note 161, at 27-28 (same); Romano,
supra note 7, at 46-68 (same).
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agreeing that if interest rates fall, A will make payments to B, while if
rates rise, B will pay A.244
As this example shows, financial derivatives give parties an eco-
nomic interest in an underlying financial instrument without requir-
ing either side to actually deliver the instrument. In other words,
OTC derivatives are off-exchange futures and options not intended to
be settled by delivery—the modern equivalent of nineteenth-century
“difference contracts.” Banks, corporations, investment funds, and
other end users who trade derivatives enter these agreements for the
same reasons that traders once entered difference contracts. Thus,
some end users employ derivatives to hedge against business risks
from fluctuating interest rates and commodity prices, while others are
driven by speculative passions. A recent survey of nonfinancial firms,
for example, found that over 43% of those using derivatives reported
having done so to “take a view”—or speculate—on the future direc-
tion of prices and interest rates.245
That observation raises the question of how a thriving OTC de-
rivatives market can be reconciled with the pattern of legal hostility
toward speculators described in Part I. In particular, how did a $70
trillion OTC market manage to develop in the face of the CEA’s ban
on off-exchange futures? Historical accident may provide at least
part of the answer. Organized futures and option trading has tradi-
tionally focused on such industrial and agricultural commodities as
silver and porkbellies.246 In contrast, most OTC derivatives are
agreements whose values are derived from financial instruments such
as corporate equities and debt obligations.247 Although it is easy with
the benefit of hindsight to recognize financial derivatives as off-
exchange futures and options, when the market first grew to signifi-
cant size in the 1980s, the CFTC initially appeared reluctant to assert
jurisdiction over such unfamiliar arrangements.248 Thus it ignored
244. Swap agreements can also be based on currency exchange rates, commodity prices, or
stock prices. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 7, at 1467.
245. Gordon M. Bodnar et al., Wharton Survey of Derivatives Usage by U.S. Non-Financial
Firms, 24 FIN. MGMT. 104, 106 (1995).
246. See Romano, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that the first exchange-traded futures contract
on a financial asset was introduced in 1975).
247. For example, one of the largest OTC markets is the market for interest rate swaps,
instruments whose values are derived from debt obligations. See supra notes 243-44 and ac-
companying text (describing swaps).
248. See Markham, Confederate Bonds, supra note 161, at 18-19.
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some forms of financial derivatives entirely,249 while granting others
(for example, swaps) administrative exemptions from the CEA.250
B. The Controversy over Applying the CEA to Derivatives
The CFTC’s initial reluctance to intervene in the derivatives
market has since been replaced by a more aggressive regulatory
stance.251 Spurred by continued explosive growth in derivatives trad-
ing and reports of spectacular losses suffered by speculating corpora-
tions and investment funds,252 the CFTC has begun to grapple more
seriously with the question of whether and how to claim jurisdiction
over the new market. Most dramatically, in May 1998 the CFTC is-
sued an administrative release announcing its intention to undertake
a “comprehensive regulatory reform effort” directed at OTC deriva-
tives trading.253 The release makes clear the CFTC’s position that the
CEA applies to off-exchange derivatives trading. The release also
notes the CFTC’s concern about “problems and abuses” in the OTC
market.254
The CFTC’s release thus raises, for the first time, the prospect of
significant government intervention in the hitherto largely unregu-
lated derivatives market. Indeed, if the CEA is applied to financial
derivatives, off-exchange trading in these instruments is presump-
tively illegal absent some express exemption. As a result, the release
has provoked a barrage of objections from the derivatives industry
and from other federal agencies eager to stake their own jurisdic-
249. For example, it was only in 1985 that the CFTC established a Financial Products Advi-
sory Committee to advise it on financial derivatives. See Markham, Hybrid Instruments, supra
note 161, at 40-41.
250. In 1992, Congress amended the CEA to grant the CFTC express authority to exempt
particular classes of transactions from regulation. See Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (1994)). The CFTC subse-
quently exercised this power to exempt several important forms of financial derivatives from
oversight, including swaps. See 17 C.F.R. § 35 (1998).
251. For example, in Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465 (1997), the CFTC claimed jurisdiction
over the “interbank” market for trading in options based on foreign currencies. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court rejected the CFTC’s claim, citing the “Treasury Amendment” to the CEA, 7
U.S.C. § 2(ii) (1994), which states that the statute does not apply to transactions in foreign cur-
rencies. See Dunn, 519 U.S. at 469.
252. See Markham, Confederate Bonds, supra note 161, at 28-31 (listing numerous instances
of derivatives losses); Romano, supra note 7, at 2-3 (same).
253. Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,115 (1998) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 34-35) (proposed May 12, 1998).
254. Id. at 26,115.
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tional claims.255 Congress has entered the fray by passing legislation
that effectively blocks the CFTC from issuing any new regulations,
pending the results of an investigation by a presidential working
group that includes representatives from the Treasury, the Federal
Reserve, and the SEC, all of whom oppose the idea of CFTC regula-
tion.256 Meanwhile, legislators in the House of Representatives have
introduced legislation to expressly preclude the CFTC from regulat-
ing derivatives.257
Federal lawmakers appear to have reached a critical juncture in
the ongoing dispute over derivatives. After years of legal uncertainty,
the question of whether and to what extent the CEA’s antispecula-
tion provisions apply to derivatives may be about to be determined.
The answer to that question carries vital economic implications. If
the CFTC succeeds in its quest to regulate derivatives, it may find it-
self trying to stuff a multi-trillion dollar genie back into its bottle. Al-
though the CFTC’s release clearly states that any new regulatory re-
strictions will apply only prospectively,258 it is difficult to imagine that
the derivatives market could retain its current size if the CEA’s ex-
change trading requirement were applied to confine derivatives to
the regulated exchanges.259 On the other hand, if Congress exempts
derivatives from the CEA, the result will be a radical departure from
legal tradition.260 As described in Part I, American common law has
long refused to enforce off-exchange contracts of sale not intended to
be settled by delivery of the good or service in question.261 Thus, in
declaring derivatives exempt from the CEA, Congress would be
overruling law that dates back not just decades, but centuries.
255. See Chair Introduces Bill, supra note 17, at 1197 (noting that the CFTC release has un-
settled the market and provoked criticisms from the SEC, the Federal Reserve Board, and the
Treasury, which claim that the CFTC lacks authority).
256. See David Barboza & Jeff Gerth, Who’s in Charge? Agency Infighting and Regulatory
Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at C14 (discussing CFTC’s proposal and Congress’s
response).
257. See Chair Introduces Bill, supra note 17, at 1197.
258. See Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. at 26,116.
259. Thus some commentators have predicted that aggressive CFTC regulation of deriva-
tives would undermine the domestic market and drive trading offshore. See, e.g., Tormey, supra
note 9, at 2358.
260. The result would be the same if the CFTC takes the nominal position that the CEA
applies to derivatives, but then declares derivatives exempt from regulation. See supra notes 15,
250, and accompanying text (discussing the CFTC’s exemptive authority); see also infra note
290 and accompanying text (same).
261. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
STOUT TO PRINTER 04/15/99  4:22 PM
1999] WHY THE LAW HATES SPECULATORS 769
What is the best course? Although derivatives raise a variety of
policy issues, one of the most important is the derivatives market’s
effect on the level of speculative activity found in the United States
economy. Derivatives allow speculators to do an end run around the
CEA’s exchange trading requirement by placing naked price wagers
in the OTC market. They also allow traders to evade margin re-
quirements, short sales restrictions, capital gains holding period re-
quirements, and other rules that restrain speculation in spot mar-
kets.262 The risk hedging and information arbitrage models of trading
imply that these opportunities for regulatory arbitrage may be a
blessing rather than a bane. Thus commentators routinely praise de-
rivatives for making it easier to shift risk and for increasing the accu-
racy of market prices,263 and attack the idea of CFTC regulation as an
unnecessary obstacle to financial “innovation.”264
262. See, e.g., REVIEW OF FEDERAL MARGIN REGULATIONS, supra note 115, at 57-64
(describing margin requirements for exchange traded futures and options on futures, and not-
ing that margin requirements range from a fraction of 1% to approximately 10% of a contract’s
value); David A. Weisbach, Should a Short Sale Against the Box Be a Realization Event?, 50
NAT’L TAX J. 495, 495-96 (1997) (discussing how equity swaps can be used to avoid capital
gains holding requirements); Worley, supra note 121, at 1293-98 (describing how bearish stock
speculators can avoid the SEC’s short sale restrictions by shorting stock index futures and op-
tions).
263. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 7, at 1008 (observing that financial derivatives are com-
monly praised for shifting risk and promoting better pricing); Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives,
supra note 7, at 1466 (arguing that derivatives can be valuable for hedging risks); Romano, su-
pra note 7, at 5 (stating that derivatives “serve important economic functions that cannot be
overemphasized,” including risk hedging and price discovery); Stein, supra note 69, at 498
(describing how derivatives have been praised for contributing to the efficiency of markets).
But see Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 7, at 1466 n.35 (“It is important not to exag-
gerate the private benefit of being able to hedge against such market risks.”).
264. See, e.g., Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 7, at 1513 (warning against
“Procrustean” regulation of derivatives that hampers financial innovation); Markham, Confed-
erate Bonds, supra note 161, at 72 (contending that regulating OTC derivatives under the CEA
“may be too intrusive, resulting in a strangling of this economically useful, highly innovative,
and still growing industry”); Markham, Hybrid Instruments, supra note 161, at 2, 53 (arguing
that CFTC regulations would “hamper innovation” and result in lost market opportunities);
Merton H. Miller & Christopher L. Culp, The SEC’s Costly Disclosure Rules, WALL ST. J., June
15, 1996, at A14 (criticizing as “worse than worthless” a proposed SEC rule that would require
public companies using derivatives to disclose estimates of their exposures to market risk). But
cf. Hazen, supra note 7, at 1031 (maintaining that derivatives should be subject to an economic
purpose test similar to that imposed by the CFTC on the exchanges).
Indeed, the idea that speculation in futures and options necessarily serves economic effi-
ciency has begun to threaten the CFTC’s authority to police against speculative trading on the
regulated exchanges as well. Commentators have begun to attack the wisdom of the CEA by
arguing that restrictions on futures and options trading, whether on or off the exchanges, only
impede progress and financial innovation. See John H. Stassen, Propaganda as Positive Law:
Section 3 of the Commodity Exchange Act (A Case Study of How Economic Facts Can Be
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To the observer familiar with the heterogeneous expectations
model of trading and its implications, however, the sudden appear-
ance of an immense speculative market seems a more ominous de-
velopment. Thus the next Section considers how the HE approach
can offer insights to regulators seeking to understanding the eco-
nomic consequences of derivatives trading.
C. HE Theory and the Economic Consequences of Derivatives
Speculation
When Congress passed the CEA in 1936, its members firmly be-
lieved that speculators harm markets.265 Observers familiar with the
risk hedging and information arbitrage models of trading may find
the notion that speculation can be harmful unattractively old-
fashioned. Thus contemporary scholars and policymakers tend to
downplay the CEA’s antispeculation origins,266 emphasizing instead
the CEA’s role in preventing fraud and manipulation in futures and
options trading.267 Similarly, the principal danger regulators now as-
                                                                                                                                     
Changed By Act of Congress), 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 635, 655 (1982) (attacking as
“economically unsound” the CEA’s premise that speculation can be excessive); Stein, supra
note 69, at 473 (noting that the exchange trading requirement which is the CEA’s central pur-
pose “recently has been attacked as unworkable and undesirable” because it discourages useful
transactions).
The organized exchanges, complaining of a competitive disadvantage relative to the un-
regulated OTC market, have adopted these arguments to push for a professional market, or
“ProMarket,” exemption from the CEA that would apply to all exchange-based trading be-
tween parties with net worths of at least $1 million. See S. 257, 105th Cong. § 6 (1997); H.R.
467, 105th Cong. § 102 (1997). Although $1 million may seem a significant figure, an exemption
set at this level would apply to virtually all corporations, banks, pension funds, and other insti-
tutional traders, as well as to many individuals. The CFTC has estimated that the net result
would be to remove 90% of exchange trading volume from CFTC oversight. See Exchanges’
Self-Interest Would Prevail Under ProMarket Proposal, Born Warns, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA), at 621 (May 2, 1997) (reporting the remarks of CFTC Chairman Brooksley Born).
265. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Indeed, stripped of its original antispecula-
tion purpose, much of the CEA no longer makes sense. Why require exchange-traded futures
to serve an economic purpose beyond “mere speculation,” for example, if speculation itself
serves an economic purpose?
266. Other antispeculation doctrines have been subject to similar treatment. Thus, for ex-
ample, modern commentators now generally explain the insurance doctrines of indemnity and
insurable interest as responses to problems of moral hazard, see supra text accompanying notes
105-08, and justify the capital gains holding period requirement on non-antispeculative
grounds, see supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1997) (noting the CFTC’s claim that it
should have jurisdiction over currency derivatives to prevent fraud); Markham, Manipulation,
supra note 218, at 282-83 (1991) (suggesting that the CFTC was created to prevent manipula-
tion); Perdue, supra note 218, at 345 (emphasizing the CFTC’s antimanipulation purpose). This
revisionist view paints the CEA as a technical and somewhat trivial consumer protection stat-
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sociate with derivatives is not excessive speculation but the perceived
peril of “systemic” risk—the possibility that cataclysmic derivatives
losses at one firm might trigger a chain reaction of crises at other
firms.268
The HE model of speculation suggests, however, that the mod-
ern assumption that speculation is efficient may be dangerously mis-
leading when applied to derivatives trading. The analysis provided in
Part III implies that HE trading can lead to three distinct forms of
economic harm. First, speculation driven by subjective disagreement
can reduce social welfare by eroding trader wealth through transac-
tion costs without providing any compensating benefit; second,
speculation can reduce social welfare by increasing traders’ risk, and
with it the level of risk found in the marketplace; and third, specula-
tion can in some circumstances lead to price distortions and market
bubbles.269 Let us consider how each form of harm might apply in the
case of speculation in OTC derivatives.
Focusing first on derivatives speculation’s effects on trader
wealth, it is important to recognize that corporations and investment
funds that attempt to earn trading profits by speculating in deriva-
tives must incur a number of expenses. These include the time and
effort necessary to make market predictions, as well as the fees and
spreads charged by derivatives dealers. It is difficult to estimate how
much is spent annually on costs associated with OTC derivatives
trading. However, assuming (extremely conservatively) that transac-
tion costs average only a tenth of a percent of notional amount,270 a
$70 trillion OTC market implies transaction costs of approximately
$70 billion. If HE trading is common in the OTC market, much if not
most of that $70 billion has been squandered in the zero-sum game of
trying to outpredict other HE speculators.
An even more important source of trader welfare losses from
OTC derivatives trading may take the form of increased and uncom-
pensated trader risk. The HE model predicts that the opportunity to
                                                                                                                                     
ute, of interest only to the small subgroup of the population that trades on the organized fu-
tures exchanges.
268. See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 7-8 (discussing systemic risk). Rather than sup-
porting the role of the CFTC, a focus on systemic risk emphasizes the importance of the Fed-
eral Reserve’s monitoring of minimum capital requirements and oversight of reporting systems.
See id. at 14-16 (listing GAO’s recommendations regarding derivatives, which do not mention
the CFTC).
269. See supra Part III.B.
270. See Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 1014 n.132 (describing dealers’ rela-
tively low spreads on simple swaps as ranging from 0.12% to 0.22%).
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speculate in OTC derivatives can tempt end users into volatile mar-
kets they would otherwise choose to avoid. Thus Procter & Gamble
and Gibson Greetings, normally in the staid businesses of hawking
shampoo and greeting cards, lost hundreds of millions of dollars
speculating on interest rates in the swaps market.271 An even more
compelling example may be found in the recent near collapse of the
hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management L.P.272 Because the
managers of Long-Term Capital believed that they could predict fu-
ture patterns of price volatility in financial markets, they not only
risked their investors’ money to place derivatives bets, they also bor-
rowed money to increase the size of the bets. At one point, the firm
held derivatives positions approximately 100 times larger than its
capital base.273
By suggesting how the opportunity to speculate cheaply through
derivatives may tempt traders into accepting uncompensated risks,
the HE model of speculation accordingly offers to solve an important
theoretical puzzle: the perceived link between derivatives trading and
increased systemic risk. Even before the collapse of Barings Bank
and the near collapse of Long-Term Capital, policymakers feared
that derivatives trading losses might drive one or more large financial
institutions into bankruptcy, triggering a chain reaction of other firm
failures.274 This link between derivatives and increased systemic risk is
difficult to explain under the conventional risk hedging model of
trading. After all, if derivatives are used primarily for hedging, they
should reduce systemic risk by reducing the risks of the individual
firms that make up the system.275 In contrast, the HE model explains
how derivatives trading can increase systemic risk by increasing both
271. See sources cited supra note 27 (describing these and other swaps market losses); see
also Henry T.C. Hu, Derivatives and Unexpected Risks: An Introduction, 21 J. CORP. L. 1
(1995) (observing that corporate derivatives “end-users, intentionally or not, sometimes en-
tered derivative realities that involved more, rather than less, fearsome market risks”).
272. See generally Steven Lipin et al., Bailout Blues: How a Big Hedge Fund Marketed Its
Expertise and Shrouded Its Risks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1998, at A1 (discussing the near-col-
lapse of Long-Term Capital).
273. See id.
274. See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 7-8 (associating derivatives with increased sys-
temic risk). The recent near failure of Long-Term Capital has reinforced this perception that
derivatives increase risk. See, e.g., David Barboza & Jeff Gerth, On Regulating Derivatives:
Long-Term Capital Bailout Prompts Call for Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at C1 (“‘You
have huge risks building up on the shoulders of these few huge financial institutions.’”)
(quoting statement by Henry T.C. Hu).
275. Cf. supra text accompanying note 152 (discussing information arbitrageurs’ techniques
for reaping profits without taking on increased risk).
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the number of firms that expose themselves to risk and the level of
their exposure.
The discussion above suggests that HE speculation in derivatives
clearly carries the potential to reduce social welfare by eroding trad-
ers’ wealth while increasing the risks they face. As for the third form
of harm often associated with speculative trading—allocative ineffi-
ciency due to market bubbles and similar price distortions—the
analysis provided in Part III is more equivocal.276 Because derivatives
are essentially off-exchange futures and options, the existence of a
thriving derivatives market can significantly reduce obstacles to short
selling. Thus, in some cases, opening a derivatives market may im-
prove the accuracy of market prices by eliminating the price-inflating
effects of short sales restrictions in the spot market for the underlying
commodity or financial instrument. This analysis implies that deriva-
tives can encourage more accurate market prices through a mecha-
nism quite different from that suggested by the information arbitrage
model, suggesting a hitherto unrecognized social benefit from deriva-
tives trading. At the same time, if opening a derivatives market in-
creases the absolute dispersion of traders’ opinions by increasing the
total pool of speculators, and if some restrictions on short sales re-
main, the net result may be more bubbles.277 An HE analysis of de-
rivatives speculation accordingly predicts that derivatives trading has
the potential to improve the accuracy of market prices in some cir-
cumstances, and to distort prices in others.
A more sophisticated analysis of the derivatives market that in-
corporates the lessons of the HE model consequently offers the un-
settling prediction that derivatives trading can be the source of effi-
ciency losses as well as efficiency gains. That possibility carries
important implications for public policy. Thus far, policymakers have
been unable to resolve the conflict between economic theory’s claim
that derivatives speculation promotes efficiency and the strong intui-
tion that something is amiss when a large portion of the nation’s en-
ergy and resources is devoted to speculative activity. As a result,
lawmakers have adopted a largely hands-off approach toward OTC
derivatives trading.
276. See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
277. Moreover, encouraging speculation in derivatives runs the risk of increasing traders’
welfare losses due to transaction costs and increased risk exposure. See supra notes 174-76 and
accompanying text.
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The HE model suggests, however, that in some circumstances
unrestrained speculation may indeed pose a threat to social welfare.
Adding the insights of the HE approach to those of the risk hedging
and information arbitrage theories thus clarifies the fundamental
economic problem posed by OTC derivatives. Put simply, that prob-
lem is: how can we protect beneficial forms of derivatives trading while
discouraging welfare-reducing, price-distorting transactions? A full
discussion of the many policy issues posed by derivatives and the op-
timal regulatory response lies beyond the scope of this Article. The
HE model suggests some interesting potential directions for explora-
tion, however. In particular, two traditional antispeculation rules—
the CEA and its common law precursor, the rule against difference
contracts—may offer useful lessons for lawmakers seeking to con-
strain destructive forms of derivatives speculation. Thus the next Sec-
tion considers how lawmakers might go about trying to maximize the
social benefits of derivatives while minimizing their social costs.
D. Discouraging HE Trading in Derivatives: Lessons from the CEA
The challenge of filtering out welfare-reducing speculation while
protecting economically beneficial transactions exists in any specula-
tive market, and is not unique to OTC derivatives. Policymakers ac-
cordingly can look to existing antispeculation laws for strategies to
temper welfare-reducing speculation in derivatives. One obvious pro-
totype for regulation is the CEA.
As discussed in Part I, the CEA’s ban on off-exchange futures
can be viewed as a codification of the common law ban on difference
contracts.278 In addition to the exchange trading requirement, how-
ever, the CEA includes other provisions that significantly modify the
common law.279 In particular, the common law placed no restrictions
on the kinds of contracts that could be traded on the organized ex-
changes, choosing instead to leave those decisions to the exchanges
and their members. In contrast, the CEA created a government en-
278. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
279. For example, the CEA authorizes the CFTC to police against fraud and manipulation
in futures trading, see sources cited supra note 218 (discussing the CEA’s antimanipulation
function), allows the imposition of trading and position limits on individual traders, see supra
note 95 and accompanying text (discussing position and trading limits), and imposes criminal
penalties for off-exchange trading, see supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing crimi-
nal penalties).
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tity to act as an antispeculative filter: the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission.280
The CFTC filters out speculation in futures and options on at
least three levels. First, the CFTC discourages speculation in ex-
change-listed contracts at the level of individual transactions, by im-
posing position limits and trading limits that are not applied to trades
that serve a “bona fide” hedging purpose.281 Second, the CFTC serves
as a gatekeeper to the exchanges by deciding what sorts of standard-
ized contracts may be listed for trading in the first place. This judg-
ment revolves, in part, around whether a particular contract can be
shown to serve an economic purpose beyond “mere speculation.”282
Third, the CFTC has the authority to approve off-exchange trading in
certain classes of instruments by granting administrative exemptions
to the CEA. Before its May 1998 release, the CFTC used this author-
ity to exempt several important classes of financial derivatives from
oversight, including swaps and hybrids.283
The CFTC accordingly enjoys considerable authority to ban or
otherwise limit transactions it does not believe to be economically
useful. Thus, one possible strategy for discouraging disagreement-
based speculation in financial derivatives would be to affirm the
CFTC’s claim that the CEA applies to OTC derivatives trading. This
approach would treat financial derivatives agreements as illegal un-
less the CFTC either approved a particular type of contract for trad-
ing on a regulated futures exchange, or granted that type of contract
an administrative exemption from the CEA.284 Derivatives users
would accordingly be required to demonstrate to the CFTC’s satisfac-
tion on a contract-by-contract285 basis that their trading served some
beneficial economic purpose.
Some observers might object to this approach on the ground that
it is too difficult for the CFTC to distinguish between useful risk
280. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
283. See Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,116 (1998) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 34-35) (proposed May 12, 1998) (discussing the CFTC’s decision to exempt
swaps from regulation); see also supra note 250 and accompanying text (same).
284. Indeed, Congress could go further and statutorily reverse the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465 (1997), by enacting legislation declaring that the CEA’s
Treasury Amendment does not exempt trading in currency-based derivatives. See supra note
251 (discussing Dunn and the Treasury Amendment).
285. Or even, in the case of trading limits and position limits, transaction-by-transaction.
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hedging and information arbitrage trades on the one hand, and
wasteful disagreement-based transactions on the other. While no per-
fect means of accurately identifying the nature of individual transac-
tions may exist, there are a number of ways the CFTC can crudely
distinguish beneficial from harmful trading. For example, just as the
CFTC now allows traders in exchange-listed futures to escape posi-
tion limits and trading limits by demonstrating a hedging purpose, the
CFTC might require traders who want to list a particular type of de-
rivatives contract for trading on an exchange to demonstrate that the
contract offsets a preexisting source of risk. Similarly, if the CFTC
finds that the market for a particular futures contract appears domi-
nated almost entirely by profit-seeking speculators rather than con-
sumers and producers, or that speculators as a class seem to be losing
money trading in the contract, it might reasonably conclude that the
contract appeals primarily to HE traders rather than true information
arbitrageurs.286
To a generation of legal scholars raised on interest group theory,
this notion of the CFTC as a bureaucratic gatekeeper to the deriva-
tives market may seem unattractive.287 History suggests, however, that
the CFTC has served as a relatively faithful antispeculation watch-
dog. In the United States, most speculative disasters have occurred
outside the regulated exchanges. Orange County, Procter & Gamble,
and Gibson Greetings all suffered their losses while trading in the
OTC market.288 In contrast, the lax regulation characteristic of many
foreign futures exchanges has produced such high-profile catastro-
phes as those of Barings Bank and Sumitomo Bank, which both lost
billions of dollars speculating in standardized contracts on organized
foreign futures exchanges.289
286. See supra text accompanying notes 171-76 (describing HE trading as characterized by
speculator-with-speculator trading and ex post speculator losses).
287. For example, Roberta Romano has argued that the CEA can best be explained not as
a good faith legislative attempt to serve the public interest by discouraging welfare-reducing
speculation, but as the possibly inefficient product of a legislative process in which an organized
and self-interested coalition of commodities producers, banks, and organized futures exchanges
has managed to control the regulatory outcome. See Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics
of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279, 314-17 (1997).
288. See sources cited supra note 27 (describing losses).
289. See Coming a Cropper in Copper, THE ECONOMIST, June 22, 1996, at 69 (noting that
Sumitomo’s losses resulted from trading copper futures and options on the London Metal Ex-
change); Stephen E. Frank, J.P. Morgan Reprimanded on Sumitomo, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1997,
at A3 (reporting that Sumitomo’s losses totaled $2.6 billion); Richard L. Holman, World Wire,
WALL ST. J., June 12, 1997, at A12 (reporting that Barings Bank’s losses totaled $1.36 billion);
Sara Webb et al., A Royal Mess: Britain’s Barings PLC Bets on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Feb.
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Yet applying the CEA in its present form to OTC derivatives in-
evitably raises the possibility that CFTC oversight designed to deter
welfare-reducing speculation may also deter beneficial trading. Un-
like the standardized contracts traditionally traded on the organized
exchanges, OTC derivatives are privately negotiated, often highly
customized instruments that can take a virtually infinite number of
forms. As a result, applying the CEA to derivatives might require
many users to seek the CFTC’s prior approval for each and every
contract they enter, which might prove an insurmountable obstacle to
many beneficial transactions. Yet, if the CFTC uses its authority to
declare a broad class of derivatives exempt from the CEA, it has ef-
fectively abandoned any attempt to discourage HE speculation in the
exempt instruments.
E. Discouraging HE Trading in Derivatives: Lessons from the
Common Law
That observation sets the stage for exploring an alternative to
the apparently binary choice now faced by federal regulators of ei-
ther allowing the CFTC to substantively regulate OTC derivatives, or
exempting them from the CEA entirely. The alternative is to apply
the CEA to derivatives, while amending the statute to eliminate the
CEA provisions that criminalize off-exchange futures and options
trading.290 Such an amendment would effectively return us to the
common law rule, under which difference contracts that were not en-
tered on an organized exchange and that could not be shown to serve
a hedging purpose were regarded as unenforceable—but not crimi-
nal—transactions.
Under the common law, traders were free to enter off-exchange
difference agreements that did not serve an indemnity (hedging) pur-
pose.291 However, because such agreements were legally unenforce-
able, traders had to find private mechanisms to enforce them. Legal
scholars recently have shown a keen interest in situations where mar-
ket participants choose to settle their disagreements through private
enforcement mechanisms, rather than by going to court and invoking
the coercive powers of the state.292 Most discussions of such private
                                                                                                                                     
27, 1995, at A1 (noting that Barings incurred its losses trading stock-index futures contracts on
the Osaka and Singapore International Monetary exchanges).
290. See 7 U.S.C. § 13 (1994); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
292. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) (arguing that people can often settle disputes without referring to any source
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ordering have focused, however, on cases where parties voluntarily
avoid the legal system. The heterogeneous expectations model of
speculation offers an interesting variation on this theme by suggest-
ing how private ordering can be superior to government coercion not
only when parties voluntarily opt out of the legal system, but also,
sometimes, when they are involuntarily shut out.
To see how a rule of civil unenforceability may provide a supe-
rior solution to the problem of welfare-reducing speculation in OTC
derivatives, consider how the parties to an OTC agreement might
find ways of assuring performance other than judicial enforcement.
Most obviously, in situations where parties deal repeatedly with each
other or with others in the same business community, one of the best
ways to assure performance is through reputation. Because a good
reputation—that is, a reputation for fulfilling contractual obliga-
tions—can induce others to trade, the desire to preserve reputational
capital protects against opportunistic defaults in legally void agree-
ments.293 For example, the swaps market is dominated by large banks,
and reputation is regarded as such a reliable guarantee of perform-
ance that even very large trades are often put into writing only after a
transaction has actually occurred.294 This analysis suggests that when a
corporation, bank, or investment fund expects to be using OTC de-
rivatives on an ongoing basis, it will be reluctant to renege on a le-
gally unenforceable agreement for fear that it will be excluded from
participating in the OTC derivatives market in the future.
In an OTC derivatives market characterized by a mix of hedging,
information arbitrage, and HE trading, which sorts of traders are
likely to be repeat players with strong reputational interests in keep-
ing their promises? Let us return to the phenomena of ex post
speculator losses and trader learning discussed in Part III.295 Informa-
                                                                                                                                     
of law); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (analyzing the elaborate rules by which dia-
mond industry participants resolve disputes without reference to state-created law). See gener-
ally Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996).
293. See Bernstein, supra note 292, at 131-32 (discussing reputation as an enforcement
mechanism). When contracts are legally unenforceable, contracting parties can also try to re-
duce the chance of opportunistic breach through such measures as mutual incremental per-
formance or posting a bond. Neither seems particularly useful in the context of OTC deriva-
tives, however. Given the size of most derivatives deals, posting a bond is likely to prove
prohibitively expensive, while incremental performance no longer works when prices or inter-
est rates shift to the point that one party incurs a significant trading loss.
294. Clair A. Hill, Order In The Shadow of the Law, or How Contracts Do Things With
Words 10 n.18 (1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
295. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
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tion arbitrageurs, and risk-accepting speculators who deal with hedg-
ers, generally enjoy ex post the trading profits they expected ex ante.
Thus arbitrageurs and risk-accepting speculators are likely to become
repeat players with strong interests in protecting their reputations for
keeping promises, even when a particular trade is no longer advanta-
geous.296 HE speculators, in contrast, on average incur losses from
trading, and eventually stop. Thus HE traders are far more likely to
be amateurs who will renege opportunistically on a derivatives
agreement if a deal turns against them. As an example, consider what
happened when Gibson Greetings, Procter & Gamble, and Orange
County suffered derivatives trading losses. All three were relative
newcomers to the derivatives market whose trades were driven by
the speculative desire to reap profits by predicting interest rates,297
and all three responded to their trading losses by filing lawsuits chal-
lenging the enforceability of their agreements.298
Declaring OTC derivatives unenforceable but not illegal ac-
cordingly may discourage HE speculation while allowing risk hedging
and information arbitrage trading. If the individuals and institutions
who deal in derivatives know they cannot go to court to enforce their
agreements, trading will tend to take place only among those with
large reputational stakes—that is, among repeat players whose trad-
ing not only appears beneficial ex ante, but actually results in ex post
benefits. Amateurs will be able to find willing counterparties only if
they can demonstrate that their derivatives contracts are actually en-
forceable “indemnity” agreements that hedge against demonstrable
risks, or, perhaps, that they are information arbitrageurs or risk-
accepting speculators with histories of profitable dealings in other
markets who are likely to become repeat players in derivatives.299
296. Even under a rule of civil unenforceability, risk-accepting speculators would be able to
enforce their derivatives agreements in the courts if they could prove that their counterparties
were using their agreements to offset preexisting sources of business risk. See supra notes 65-67
and accompanying text (discussing the enforceability of indemnity agreements).
297. See sources cited supra note 27 (describing cases).
298. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1996);
Knecht, supra note 27, at A3 (discussing the Orange County suit); Paulette Thomas, Procter &
Gamble Sues Bankers Trust Because of Huge Losses on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1994,
at A6 (discussing Procter & Gamble suit); Richard Walters, Bankers Trust Sued over U.S. De-
rivatives Contracts, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at 27 (discussing Gibson Greetings’s claim that
Bankers Trust “did not reveal the material risks and misrepresented the nature of the transac-
tions and thereby deceived and defrauded” the company).
299. Moreover, if derivatives are legally unenforceable, both parties to the transaction may
have an incentive to share information regarding their estimates of future risks and returns, in
an attempt to ensure that neither will renege later. Such sharing may itself discourage HE
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Thus, by modifying the CEA to make off-exchange futures and op-
tions unenforceable in the courts, lawmakers can encourage private
ordering that may be more effective than government regulation in
filtering out speculation from the OTC market.
Indeed, to some extent this may be the system of “regulation”
currently in place, albeit by default rather than by design. When
trading in financial derivatives first became commonplace in the early
1980s, many traders seemed to presume that derivatives, like other
contracts, were legally enforceable. By the late 1980s and early 1990s,
however, a series of well-publicized losses suffered by speculating in-
dividuals, corporations, and investment funds produced a number of
lawsuits filed by disappointed derivatives users that challenged the
validity of their agreements on grounds ranging from antibucketshop
laws, to the CEA, to old-fashioned fraud.300 Additional questions
have been raised by the CFTC’s recent eagerness to claim jurisdiction
over the OTC market, and especially by its May 1998 concept release
announcing its intent to consider comprehensive regulation.301 The
net result has been to cast a cloud of legal uncertainty over the OTC
market.302
                                                                                                                                     
speculation by encouraging derivatives traders to form more homogenous expectations. This
result compares favorably with the incentives to mislead that exist when derivatives contracts
are legally enforceable. For example, one prominent derivatives dealer, Banker’s Trust, has
been accused in several recent lawsuits of misleading its clients about the risks associated with
the derivatives it sold them. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble, 925 F. Supp. 1270; Thomas, supra note
298, at A6 (discussing the Procter & Gamble suit); Walters, supra note 298, at 27 (discussing
Gibson Greetings’s claim).
300. See, e.g., CFTC v. Noble Metals Int’l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1995) (alleging viola-
tions of the CEA); Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993) (alleging viola-
tions of the CEA and antibucketshop laws); United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir.
1987) (alleging violations of mail and wire fraud statutes); Thomas, supra note 298, at A6
(discussing suit alleging fraud and deception); Walters, supra note 298, at 27 (discussing Gibson
Greetings’s claims of misrepresentation); Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North Am. Petrol.,
738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (alleging manipulation in derivatives transaction).
301. Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 34-35) (proposed May 12, 1998); see also sources listed supra note 17 (reporting on the ad-
verse reaction to the release).
302. See Alton B. Harris, The CFTC and Derivative Products: Purposeful Ambiguity and
Jurisdictional Reach, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1117, 1167 (1996) (stating that “‘court rulings . . .
conspired to keep OTC derivatives under a cloud of legal uncertainty,’ and that the CFTC, in
order ‘to avoid disrupting the new OTC derivatives markets,’ was forced to issue ‘ever more
tortured interpretations of the [CEA]’”) (quoting Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, CFTC, Address
Before the National Ass’n of Business Economists (Feb. 15, 1995)) (alterations in original)
(emphasis omitted); Question of Who Will Regulate OTC Market Has Been Raised, CFTC Offi-
cial Suggests, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1198 (Aug. 7, 1998) (noting continuing legal
uncertainty over whether swaps must be traded on an exchange).
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Derivatives trading nevertheless continues to flourish. The sur-
prising resiliency of the OTC market suggests a provocative interpre-
tation of recent events. Following such well-publicized losses as those
of Orange County, Gibson Greetings, and Procter & Gamble in 1994,
recent years have seen comparatively few speculative disasters in the
OTC market. This may be due to relatively stable prices and interest
rates in the macroeconomy, which have decreased the odds that a de-
rivatives deal will produce great losses or great gains. It is also possi-
ble, however, that legal uncertainty about whether derivatives are en-
forceable has made traders hesitate to do business with
counterparties that they think might renege on a deal that goes sour.
Although it is perhaps premature to judge the aftermath of the Long-
Term Capital debacle, it offers an interesting contrast to earlier de-
rivatives disasters. Unlike Procter & Gamble, Gibson Greetings, and
Orange County—which all have some primary business purpose
other than derivatives trading—Long-Term Capital is a hedge fund
that was expressly created to reap profits by trading derivatives.303
Thus, its managers are arguably information arbitrageurs with a long-
term reputational interest in the OTC market. And rather than re-
nege on its derivatives contracts, Long-Term Capital has responded
thus far by seeking additional funding to permit it to perform its
agreements.304
These observations suggest that the ongoing legal uncertainty
over the enforceability of OTC derivatives contracts may have
weeded at least some HE speculators out of the contemporary de-
rivatives market. If so, policymakers debating how to respond to the
CFTC’s claim of jurisdiction over the derivatives market might do
well to recognize that if the Congress responds to the CFTC’s initia-
tive by exempting OTC derivatives from the CEA, it will have done
more than adopt a laissez faire attitude of nonintervention. In effect,
it will have chosen to sanction derivatives trading by offering to en-
force derivatives contracts in the courts. In doing so, it will have
abandoned a legal tradition of unenforceability that dates back not
just decades, but centuries.305
303. See Barboza & Gerth, supra note 274, at C1.
304. See Raghavan & Pacelle, supra note 27, at A1 (describing Long-Term Capital’s re-
sponse to its derivatives losses).
305. This analysis presumes that if Congress passes legislation to exempt OTC derivatives
from the CEA, that legislation will be deemed by the courts to have preempted state law in the
area. If not, the interesting possibility arises that federal legislation exempting derivatives from
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Is such a dramatic change in the law wise? Making derivatives
contracts legally enforceable may make sense when trading provides
economic benefits by efficiently shifting risk or improving market
prices. Thus, for example, society may want to enforce exchange-
traded contracts that the CFTC has determined serve a useful eco-
nomic purpose—for example, commodities futures that serve con-
sumers’ and producers’ hedging needs, or stock futures and options
that ward off speculative price bubbles by reducing obstacles to short
selling. In many cases of HE trading, however, enforceability may en-
courage transactions that decrease rather than increase social wel-
fare. Thus, rather than declare OTC derivatives exempt under the
CEA, Congress might do better to amend the CEA to return to the
common law rule that off-exchange futures and options not settled by
delivery are legally unenforceable unless shown to serve a hedging
purpose.
Given the legal uncertainty that already exists in the OTC mar-
ket, this approach would not so much create a new rule of civil unen-
forceability, as preserve and clarify the source of the unenforceability
that exists today. In doing so, it may also preserve the private order-
ing that may already be policing against destructive HE speculation
in the OTC market.
F. Summary: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC
Derivatives
OTC derivatives can be used to hedge against business risks and
to profit from superior price information. They can also be used,
however, to speculate on subjective disagreement over the future.
Despite the apparent difficulty of distinguishing disagreement-driven
transactions from other forms of trading, lawmakers seeking to re-
duce the welfare losses that can result from HE speculation in deriva-
tives can choose from a variety of regulatory strategies.306 One prom-
                                                                                                                                     
the CEA will resurrect the common law rule by leading courts to declare that federal law no
longer preempts state law regulating difference contract trading.
306. In addition to the government gatekeeper and private ordering strategies examined in
this Article, there are other ways lawmakers can discourage HE trading. For example, federal
securities law identifies categories of transactions that seem likely to appeal primarily to HE
speculators, and then discourages or prohibits those categories entirely. See supra notes 118-28
and accompanying text (discussing margin requirements, short sales restrictions, and the uptick
rule). This strategy is evident in other antispeculation doctrines as well. The capital gains
holding period requirement discourages the sale of any capital asset that has been held for less
than one year, see supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text, while the champerty doctrine
flatly forbids the sale of legal claims, see supra note 136 and accompanying text. In addition to
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ising approach might be to return to the common law rule by de-
criminalizing trading in futures and options contracts outside the
CFTC-regulated exchanges,307 while declaring such contracts to be le-
gally unenforceable.
A rule of civil unenforceability that encourages private ordering
may offer significant advantages as a means of filtering out HE
speculation while preserving more beneficial transactions. This is not
to suggest that the common law rule provides a perfect solution: al-
though judges can easily distinguish enforceable exchange-traded fu-
tures from OTC transactions, applying the indemnity exception for
true hedging contracts is more difficult, and almost any approach
courts can devise to apply the common law rule will likely allow some
welfare-reducing trading to occur and discourage some efficient
transactions. Nevertheless, as a result of the CFTC’s May 1998 re-
lease, it appears that legal uncertainty about OTC derivatives’ status
under the CEA is about to be resolved one way or the other. The
heterogeneous expectations model of speculation suggests that a re-
turn to the common law rule that encourages private ordering may be
an attractive alternative to “reforms” that would either require all
derivatives users to do business under the CFTC’s watchful eye and
the threat of criminal sanction, or abandon the centuries-old tradition
of legal restraints on speculation by declaring OTC derivatives ex-
empt from the CEA and therefore enforceable in the courts.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary scholars and policymakers frequently assert that
speculation—whether in stocks, real estate, or OTC derivatives—
serves a valuable economic function. This claim is grounded in mod-
ern economic theory and particularly in the risk hedging and infor-
                                                                                                                                     
categorically restricting some kinds of trading, the SEA also employs a second and more subtle
strategy for discouraging disagreement-based stock speculation: mandatory disclosure rules
that promote homogenous expectations by providing uniform, subsidized information to inves-
tors. This suggests an alternative rationale for mandatory disclosure that has been largely
overlooked by contemporary legal scholars. But see Stout, Casinos, supra note 132, at 695-97
(arguing that mandatory disclosure may serve an antispeculation function). Finally, the obser-
vation that HE traders tend to be amateurs suggests that HE speculation can be reduced in
some markets by opening the market only to larger, sophisticated traders. The CFTC may have
embraced this strategy in its recent adoption of Rule 35, which exempts from the CEA swaps
transactions between banks, insurance companies, and other relatively wealthy and sophisti-
cated parties. See Exemption of Swap Agreements, 17 C.F.R. § 35.1(b)(2) (1996).
307. Such trading is now illegal under 7 U.S.C. § 13 (1994); see also supra notes 88-90
(discussing illegality of off-exchange difference contracts).
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mation arbitrage models of speculative trading. According to these
models, speculation shifts risk to those who can bear it most easily
(risk hedging) and improves the accuracy of market prices
(information arbitrage). The net result has been a strong presump-
tion that speculative trading benefits both traders and markets.
This Article challenges the orthodox view that speculation serves
efficiency by presenting an alternative theory of speculative trading.
The heterogeneous expectations model of speculation rests on the as-
sumption that in a world where information is scarce and costly, ra-
tional traders may acquire different subsets of imperfect information
that lead them to form differing expectations for the future. These
differences of opinion, in turn, can inspire trading between individu-
als who share an identical willingness to bear risk and an identical
willingness to invest in available, but costly, information.
By incorporating the reality of subjective disagreement into the
analysis of speculative markets, the heterogeneous expectations ap-
proach sheds light on a variety of economic phenomena that have
long troubled theorists. Thus, for example, the HE theory can explain
the otherwise puzzling association between derivatives speculation
and increased systemic risk,308 and can illuminate such mysterious
economic events as the 1637 tulipmania and the Japanese “bubble
economy” of the 1980’s.309
The HE model of speculation also offers important insights to
legal scholars. Since the days of the common law, a variety of legal
rules have discouraged speculative trading both in spot markets and
in futures and options. When viewed in isolation, these doctrines can
be explained away on other grounds, or dismissed as inefficient ves-
tiges of irrational prejudice. When considered as a whole, however,
American law reveals a surprisingly strong and well-seasoned struc-
ture of rules designed to constrain speculators and to limit their role
in the economy. The HE model provides theoretical support for this
longstanding pattern of legal hostility by predicting—in direct con-
trast to the risk hedging and information arbitrage models—that
speculative trading inefficiently reduces trader welfare and can distort
market prices. The HE model thus offers insights into the efficiency
308. See supra notes 199-201, 276-77 and accompanying text (discussing how HE trading
increases risk).
309. See supra notes 206, 228, 231 and accompanying text (describing tulipmania and the
possible role of HE traders); Does America Have A Bubble Economy? No, BUS. WK., May 4,
1998, at 182 (describing the Japanese “bubble economy” of the 1980s and ascribing it to
speculation in real estate and other assets).
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of the law in general, and the efficiency of the common law in par-
ticular.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the HE model lies not in its
value to scholars, but in its lessons for lawmakers.310 In particular, the
HE model offers important immediate guidance for lawmakers in-
volved in the impending battle over financial derivatives. Over the
past two decades, a thriving, multi-trillion dollar, off-exchange mar-
ket in these poorly understood instruments has blossomed in the face
of considerable legal uncertainty over the extent to which the CEA
applies to financial derivatives. This situation may be about to change
as a result of the CFTC’s recent announcement that it intends to de-
velop a comprehensive scheme to regulate OTC trading under the
CEA. In a sense, the CFTC’s initiative is not as novel as it first ap-
pears: legal restraints on off-exchange futures and options trading
date back at least to the nineteenth century. The CFTC’s release has
nevertheless inspired champions of derivatives to argue that financial
derivatives should be expressly exempted from the CEA.
The heterogeneous expectations approach provides normative
support for the CFTC’s jurisdictional claim, by illuminating how
CFTC oversight of derivatives trading can produce welfare gains by
filtering out disagreement-based trading. It also, however, suggests a
potentially superior modification to this government gatekeeper ap-
310. The possibility that subjective disagreement can tempt individuals and institutions into
accepting risks and squandering resources in the hope of outpredicting each other carries im-
portant implications for a variety of contemporary policy issues as well.
For example, the HE model sheds light on the ongoing debate over whether monetary
policy should impose a “Tobin tax” on transactions in foreign currencies to stabilize exchange
rates, as proposed by Nobel laureate James Tobin, see Policy Forum: Sand in the Wheels of In-
ternational Finance, 105 ECON. J. 160 (1995) (discussing the Tobin tax); Robert Kuttner, A
Tiny Tax Might Curb Wall Street’s High Volatility, BUS. WK., Mar. 3, 1997, at 22 (arguing for a
Tobin tax to reduce speculation in foreign exchange). The model also sheds light on the value
of the mandatory disclosure requirements imposed by federal securities laws. See supra note
306 (describing the implications of HE theory for value of mandatory disclosure). It offers in-
sights, too, into whether individuals diagnosed with potentially fatal illnesses like AIDS should
be able to cash in their life insurance before death by selling their policies to viatical compa-
nies. See Abbie Crites-Leoni & Angellee S. Chen, Money for Life: Regulating the Viatical Set-
tlement Industry, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 77 (discussing whether the viatical industry is viable
under insurable interest rules); Shanah D. Glick, Comment, Are Viatical Settlements Securities
Within the Regulatory Control of the Securities Act of 1933?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 962-63
(1993) (same); see also supra text accompanying notes 97-98 (discussing the insurable interest
doctrine). Finally, it offers guidance on whether and how lawmakers ought to regulate “online”
gambling. See Claire Ann Koegler, Here Come the Cybercops 3: Betting on the Net, 22 NOVA L.
REV. 545 (1998) (discussing the regulation of online gambling); supra notes 43-45, 164 and ac-
companying text (discussing gambling as form of speculation).
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proach: allowing derivatives trading outside the organized exchanges,
while declaring off-exchange transactions that cannot be shown to
serve a hedging purpose to be legally unenforceable. This alternative
recognizes that when the CFTC has determined that an exchange-
traded contract serves an important economic purpose, legal en-
forcement may make sense. Outside the exchanges, however, a rule
of unenforceability would force derivatives traders to rely on private
ordering, and particularly on reputational capital, to ensure the per-
formance of agreements. This strategy—which mirrors both the
common law approach and, perhaps, the OTC market as it exists to-
day—may offer substantial advantages as a means of preserving
beneficial risk hedging and information arbitrage while discouraging
HE speculation.
In sum, the HE model offers unique and important insights to
lawmakers faced with the task of navigating the shifting shoals of the
modern derivatives markets. This observation does not imply that the
conventional risk hedging and information arbitrage models are in-
valid. Risk hedging and information arbitrage trades certainly occur,
and with some frequency. The heterogeneous expectations approach
does suggest, however, that any discussion of speculation that fails to
take account of disagreement-based trading runs the risk of being se-
riously misleading. Any full understanding of speculative markets,
and any general theory of speculation, must consider the roles of un-
certainty and disagreement.
